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The i n f o r m a t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  to e c o n o m i c  t h e o r y  has 
c h a l l e n g e d  s e v e r a l  t r a d i t i o n a l  vi ew s on the w o r k i n g  of 
f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s .  It is by no w c o m m o n l y  held that th e r e  are 
t y p i c a l  i n f o r m a t i o n a l  a s y m m e t r i e s  w h i c h  are l i k e l y  to a f fe ct 
the m a r k e t - d e t e r m i n e d  a l l o c a t i o n  of c a p i t a l  a c r o s s  firms: 
th e s e  a c c o u n t  f o r  a n u m b e r  of f e a t u r e s  - b o th b e h a v i o u r a l  
an d i n s t i t u t i o n a l  - w h i c h  had r e m a i n e d  h i t h e r t o  
u n e x p l a i n e d .
As is well known, two i n f o r m a t i o n  r e l a t e d  m e c h a n i s m s  
stan d out as m o st s i g n i f i c a n t  in e x p l a i n i n g  w i d e s p r e a d  
m a r k e t  f a i l u r e s :  m o r a l  h a z a r d  and a d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n .  As put 
f o r t h  by L a f f o n t  an d M a s k i n  (1 98 0 ) ,  the f o r m e r  is g e n e r a t e d  
by an a g e n t ' s  b e h a v i o u r  b e i n g  u n o b s e r v a b l e  by ot he r s ;  the 
l a t t e r  is r a t h e r  due to the i n f o r m a t  ion of one side of the 
m a r k e t  b e i n g  i m p e r f e c t l y  k n o w n  to the other. This 
d i s t i n c t i o n  is re le va nt , am o n g  o t h e r  th in gs , b e c a u s e  of the 
c o m p e t i t i v e  a s s u m p t i o n s  n e s t e d  in e a c h  f r a m e w o r k .  Moral 
h a z a r d  is m a i n l y  a n o n c o m p e t i t i v e  p h e n o m e n o n :  it a r i s e s  w h en
some agentC s) cont ro l( s) some va riable( s) w h i c h  c a n n o t  be 
f r e e l y  o b s e r v e d  by o t h e r ( s ) ,  and can t h e r e f o r e  be bu i l t  in
indeed, it is f a i r l y  t y p i c a l  of - m o d e l s  of t w o - p a r t y  
c o n t r a c t u a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  Ho w e v e r ,  one n e ed have a '’p r o p e r "  
m a r k e t  ( w i t h  " m a n y "  agents) for a d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n  to work: 
th er e is a c o m p e t i t i v e  bent in a g e n t s  t a k i n g  b o th th ei r
i n d i v i d u a l  q u a l i t y  and the m a r k e t - d e t e r m i n e d  a v e r a g e  q u a l i t y  
, 1as gi v e n  .
In this p a p e r  we f o c u s  on the s i m p l e s t  e x a m p l e  of 
i n f o r m a t i o n a l  a s y m m e t r i e s  and t h e i r  e f f e c t  on the 
e q u i l i b r i u m  c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  of a c o m p e t i t i v e  ec o n o m y .  
M o re p r e c i s e l y ,  we c o n s i d e r  a ( n o n s t o c h a s t i c )  t w o - p e r i o d  




























































































f i r m s  f a c i n g  a n o n l i n e a r  (con ve x) t e c h n o l o g y  c h o o s e  th e i r  
c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  to be f i n a n c e d  by share issu in g; on 
the o t h e r  hand, c o n s u m e r s  a l l o c a t e  th e i r  e n d o w m e n t s  b e t w e e n  
c u r r e n t  and f u t u r e  c o n s u m p t i o n ,  u s i n g  the f i rm s' s h a r e s  as 
the o n l y  st or e of value. The e x i s t e n c e  of a p e r f e c t l y  
c o m p e t i t i v e  sh ar e m a r k e t  a l l o w s  the r e s u l t i n g  e q u i l i b r i u m  
c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  to be j o i n t l y  d e t e r m i n e d  t o g e t h e r  w i th an 
e q u i l i b r i u m  sh ar e a l l o c a t i o n .  It is in this f r a m e w o r k  that 
a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  is i n t r o d u c e d ,  and a d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n  
e f f e c t s  ex am in ed .
A s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  is b r o u g h t  in un d e r  the s i mp le 
a s s u m p t i o n  that no s h a r e h o l d e r  kn o w s  the t e c h n o l o g y  each 
f i r m  is using, n e i t h e r  ca n he i m p r o v e  upon his k n o w l e d g e .  
A d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n  f o l l o w s  f r o m  t h is a s s u m p t i o n ,  w h i c h  
a p p e a r s  to suit the c o m p e t i t i v e  bent of the mo del. Now, 
that a d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n  i t s e l f  m a y  lead to i n e f f i c i e n t  
a l l o c a t i o n s  is a c t u a l l y  an i n t u i t i v e  and well kn o w n  result. 
H o we ve r, the p u r p o s e  of the mo d e l  is to give a ge ne r a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  o u t l o o k  to such re su lt . On the one hand, this 
a l l o w s  to b r i n g  out e x p l i c i t l y  the o v e r a l l  e f f e c t s  of the 
ag en ts ' i m p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  on the f i r m s '  choi ce s; on the 
ot h e r  hand, it p o i n t s  to the r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  the 
a d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n  m e c h a n i s m  and the i n t e r t e m p o r a l  p a t t e r n  
of r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t i o n  e n f o r c e d  by a c o m p e t i t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  
on the sh ar e m a r k e t .
The ab ov e i m p l i c a t i o n s  are s t u d i e d  w i t h i n  the 
s t o c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i l i b r i u m  notion, w h i c h  Dr e z e  (1 97 2, 1974) 
d e v e l o p e d  in a d i f f e r e n t  f r a m e w o r k .  T h is n o t i o n  is r e q u i r e d  
to o v e r c o m e  a p o t e n t i a l  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  b e t w e e n  the f i rm s' and 
the i n v e s t o r s '  b e h a v i o u r s ,  a r i s i n g  w h en a share m a r k e t  is 
e x p l i c i t l y  m o d e l e d  in w h i c h  b o th act as c o m p e t i t i v e  pr ic e 
takers: w h i l e  any f i r m ' s  o p t i m a l  c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t  is 
ba s e d  on m a r g i n a l  p r o f i t  e v a l u a t i o n ,  any s h a r e h o l d e r ' s  
i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s i o n  is d e t e r m i n e d  by the unit a v e r a g e  r e t u r n  
on such in v e s t m e n t .




























































































i n t e r t e m p o r a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  do i n t e r a c t  w i t h  a d v e r s e  
se le c t i o n ,  so that ther e m a y  be p o s i t i v e  tr a d e  e q u i l i b r i a  
e v en w h e n  a g e n t s  are v e ry p e s s i m i s t i c  ab o u t  the f i rm s' 
( u n k n o w n )  qu a l i t y .  Mo r e o v e r ,  the ag en ts ' a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  
r i sk a f f e c t s  the e q u i l i b r i u m  o u t c o m e  in such a w a y  that 
d i f f e r e n t  ( s u b j e c t i v e l y  held) q u a l i t y  e v a l u a t i o n s  are 
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  e q u i l i b r i u m  only w h e n  t r a d e r s  have 
d i f f e r e n t ,  r i sk a v e r s e  p r e f e r e n c e s .
The p a p e r  is o r g a n i z e d  as fo l l o w s .  In the next s e c t i o n  
the ba s i c  m o d e l  is p r e s e n t e d .  In a n o n s t o c h a s t i c  c o m p e t i t i v e  
ec o n o m y ,  a set of a g e n t s  o w n i n g  " t e c h n o l o g i e s "  try to sell 
t h e m  to a set of c o n s u m e r s .  The l a t t e r  e x p l o i t  th es e 
t e c h n o l o g i e s  by s e t t i n g  up e q u i t y  f i n a n c e d  f i rm s. S e c t i o n  3 
e x a m i n e s  the n a t u r a l  r e s u l t  that, u n d e r  c o m p l e t e
i n f o r m a t i o n ,  bad q u a l i t y  t e c h n o l o g i e s  m a y  not be used.
S e c t i o n  4 ta k e s  up the a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  case: if
c o n s u m e r s  c a n n o t  d i s t i n g u i s h  g o od f r o m  bad qu a l i t y ,  the
e q u i l i b r i u m  c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  is i n d e p e n d e n t  of f i r m s '  (and 
t e c h n o l o g i e s ' )  ty pe s but d e p e n d s  on the a g e n t s '  q u a l i t y  
e v a l u a t i o n s ;  some e f f i c i e n c y  a s p e c t s  are a l s o  d i s c u s s e d .  
F i na ll y, s e c t i o n  5 p r o v i d e s  some c o n c l u d i n g  re m a r k s .  All
p r o o f s  are g a t h e r e d  in the Ap pe nd ix .
2. The basic model
We c o n s i d e r  a on e c o m m o d i t y ,  t w o - p e r i o d  e c o n o m y ,  w h e r e
p r o d u c t i o n  has to be i m p l e m e n t e d  in the f i r s t  p e r i o d  to
2
y i e l d  o u t p u t  in the s e co nd . Si n c e  c o n s u m p t i o n  ta k e s  pl a c e  
in b o th p e ri od s, an i n t e r t e m p o r a l  a l l o c a t i o n  p r o b l e m  arises: 
c o n s u m e r s  e x c h a n g e  part of th e i r  w e a l t h  in p e r i o d  t=1 for 
o u t p u t  to be d e l i v e r e d  at t=2, so that the t r a n s f e r  of 
r e s o u r c e s  o v e r  t i me i n v o l v e s  t r a d i n g  in as se ts . H e r e  f o l l o w s  
a m o re d e t a i l e d  d e s c r i p t i o n  of the econ om y.
Th e r e  are two c l a s s e s  of ag en ts : t e c h n o l o g y  s e l l e r s




























































































f o r m e r  are a l so e n d o w e d  w i th " t e c h n o l o g i e s " ,  i.e. b l u e p r i n t s  
w h i c h  s p e c i f y  ho w o u t p u t  can be p r o d u c e d .  As wa s p o i n t e d  
out, o n ly one p e r i s h a b l e  g o od (" c o r n " )  is t r a d e d  in this 
ec o n o m y :  as inpu t in the firs t p e r i o d  and o u t p u t  in the 
second, as c o n s u m p t i o n  g o od in b o t h  peri od s.
2.1. Preferences, technologies, resources
In the e c o n o m y  th er e are m TS's, b e l o n g i n g  to the set 
M : =*{ 1 , . . . , m} . E a c h  of them, JEM, li ve s two peri od s, t*1,2, 
and is i d e n t i f i e d  by his p r e f e r e n c e s  and by the t e c h n o l o g y
he o w ns pr i o r  to trade. For e a ch JEM, a c o n s u m p t i o n  plan is
2
a n o n n e g a t i v e  v e c t o r  c j ; c j 1 > c j2^ eF*+> his c o n s u m p t i o n  set.
His i n t e r t e m p o r a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  are then d e s c r i b e d  by a
2
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  U j : R + - > R + ,  w h i c h  is m o n o t o n i c a l l y
i n c r e a s i n g ,  tw ic e c o n t i n u o u s l y  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  and s t r i c t l y  
q u a s i - c o n c a v e .
E a c h  agen t JEM a l s o  owns a t e c h n o l o g y ,  w h i c h  is
d e c r i b e d  by a p r o d u c t i o n  set, Yj. P r o d u c t i o n  take s one 
p e r i o d  to be c a r r i e d  out. E a ch po i n t  in Yj is a p a ir of 
input ( xj) e m p l o y e d  at t*1 and o u t p u t  Cyj) d e l i v e r e d  at t = 2. 
For e a ch TS JEM, th er e f o r e ,  we d e f i n e
Y j : “ {Cxj,yjJ | ( x j , y j 3 e R 5; y j 5 f j ( Xj )} C D
wh e r e  i n p u t s  are m e a s u r e d  by n o n n e g a t i v e  real n u mb er s. The 
p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  f j ( x j ) : R + - > R + is used as a s h o r t h a n d  to 
d e s c r i b e  t e c h n o l o g y  j. We a s s u m e  that any p r o d u c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n  e x h i b i t s  d e c r e a s i n g  r e t u r n s  to scale. We a l so 
a s s u m e  that th e r e  is no p o s i t i v e  in pu t va lu e at w h i c h  two 
d i f f e r e n t  t e c h n o l o g i e s  y i e l d  the same ( a b s o l u t e  as well as 
ma rg in al ) level of ou tp ut : as will be clear, this s i m p l i f i e s
the c r i t e r i o n  by w h i c h  t e c h n o l o g i e s  can be ranked. Our 
a s s u m p t i o n s  on p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  are s u m m a r i z e d  as




























































































A.1. For all JEM, fj(xj) least tw ic e
c o n t i n u o u s l y  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  and s u ch that:
(a) fj ( 0 ) « 0 ;
(b) 0 < -FjCxj) < fo r all xj>0;
(c) f ’j( x j) < □, for all xj>0;
( d) f o r  any j , k E M  ( jt=K) , th e r e  is no x>0 such that 
f j( x) = fK( x) or f j( x) = f£(x) .
L i ke TS's, c o n s u m e r s  - b e l o n g i n g  to the set 
N := { m + 1 , . . . , n } - live two p e ri od s. E a ch of t h e m  is
a c c o r d i n g l y  e n d o w e d  w i t h  a m o n o t o n i c a l l y  i n c r e a s i n g ,  tw ic e
c o n t i n u o u s l y  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  and s t r i c t l y  q u a s i - c o n c a v e
2
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  Uj[:R+ - > R + , d e f i n e d  o v e r  c o n s u m p t i o n  pl an s 
2
c i E R + , i E N . It is a s s u m e d  that, for at least on e c o n s u m e r ,  
the m a r g i n a l  r a te of s u b s t i t u t i o n  b e t w e e n  c u r r e n t  and f u t u r e  
c o n s u m p t i o n  v a n i s h e s  as the l a t t e r  goes to zero. Our
3
a s s u m p t i o n s  on p r e f e r e n c e s  are s u m m a r i z e d  as f o l l o w s  .
A . 2. For a n y  aEA: = MuN, u a ^ c a 1 > c a2^ is twic e 
c o n t i n u o u s l y  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  and s u ch that:
(a) ( 6 u a / 6 c a t ) >0, for all c a ^>0, t = 1,2;
( b) for an y c a and c a such that u a ( c a ) > u a ( c a ) ,
Mc a + t 1“ M ) c ']> u a (c^) , for all p, 0<p<1;
( c) for at least one iEN lim( 6 u ^ / 6 c ^ y)/( S u i / S c ^ g ) =0.
We f i n a l l y  c o n s i d e r  the r e s o u r c e  e n d o w m e n t  of our ec o n o m y .  
It is a s s u m e d  that such e n d o w m e n t  is m a d e  up by an a m o u n t  Ŵ . 
of r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  in e a ch p e r i o d  (t=1,2) such that W-j = 
W > 0  and W 2 = 0.
Some c o m m e n t s  are no w in o r d e r  ab o u t  th es e a s s u m p t i o n s .  
As f a r  as A.1 is c o n c e r n e d ,  p o i n t s  Cb) and ( d) are not 
st an da rd . The f o r m e r  v i o l a t e s  the s o - c a l l e d  Inada 
c o n d i t i o n s .  It is m a d e  here b e c a u s e  it a l l o w s  to use the 
m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t  at z e ro as a q u a l i t y  index, as w i ll be 




























































































this q u a l i t y  o r d e r i n g  f r o m  d e p e n d i n g  on the a c t i v i t y  level. 
An e x a m p l e  of a p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f y i n g  A . 2 is the 
l o g a r i t h m i c  f o r m
fj(xj) “ aj l o g ( x j +  1), a j >0
A s s u m p t i o n  A . 2 is st an da rd : d i f f e r e n t i a b i l i t y  and st ri ct
q u a s i - c o n c a v i t y  e n s u r e  the e x i s t e n c e  of a u n i q u e
4
s o l u t i o n  for the a g e n t ' s  i n t e r t e m p o r a l  a l l o c a t i o n  prob le m. 
P o i n t  ( c) ru l e s  out c o r n e r  s o l u t i o n s ,  at w h i c h  no c o n s u m e r  
is w i l l i n g  to c o n s u m e  in the s e c o n d  period. An o b v i o u s
e x a m p l e  of a u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f y i n g  A . 2 is the s t a n d a r d  
C o b b - D o u g 1a s , of the type
u a ( c a 1 > c a 2 ) = C a 1 c a2 > Pe(0,1)
F i na ll y, the w a y  r e s o u r c e s  are m o d e l e d  a l s o  d e s e r v e s  some 
co mm en ts . First, we need not s p e c i f y  how the e c o n o m y ' s  
e n d o w m e n t  is d i s t r i b u t e d  a c r o s s  agen ts , si nc e o p t i m a l i t y  is 
ou r o n ly c o nc er n. Second, s h ar es in (fut ur e) p r o d u c t i o n  are 
a s s u m e d  to be the o n l y  asse t - as will be e x p l a i n e d  late r 
in m o re de ta i l .  T h is i m p l i e s  that th er e are no c r e d i t  
m a r k e t s  open, i.e. no e x c h a n g e  of f u t u r e  r e s o u r c e s  is 
a l lo we d. Hence, we do not loose in g e n e r a l i t y  by a s s u m i n g  
that W 2 = 0 •
2.2. Further technological and institutional constraints
A s s u m i n g  W 2 = 0 e n t a i l s  that s e c o n d  p e r i o d  c o n s u m p t i o n  must 
be w h o l l y  f i n a n c e d  by i m p l e m e n t i n g  the a v a i l a b l e  
t e c h n o l o g i e s .  U n d e r  this re s p e c t ,  we c h a r a c t e r i z e  more 
s h a r p l y  our e c o n o m y  by a s s u m i n g  that T S 's are not a l l o w e d  to 
i n v e s t  th e i r  fi r s t  p e r i o d  we al th : in the s e c o n d  period, each
TS o n ly c o n s u m e s  out of the p r o c e e d s  f r o m  the sale of his 




























































































i m p o s e s  a fee in e x c h a n g e  f o r  the t e c h n o l o g y  he is s e ll in g. 
This fe e is p r o p o r t i o n a l  to the q u a n t i t y  of o u t p u t  a c t u a l l y  
p r o d u c e d ,  and is e x o g e n o u s l y  gi v e n  in the mo de l. Let the 
q u a n t i t y  of c a p i t a l  fo r t e c h n o l o g y  JEM be xj; then ag e n t  j 
w i ll get a fee 6 j f j ( x j ) ,  to be p a id at t = 2 out of the a c t u a l  
p r o d u c t i o n  d e l i v e r e d  in the s e c o n d  pe ri od . Si n c e  6j is ta k e n  
as gi v e n  o u t s i d e  the model, th e r e  is no loss of g e n e r a l i t y  
in a s s u m i n g  that it is the same for all TS's: for all JEM,
g
6j= 6> 0 . E a ch TS can sell his t e c h n o l o g y  o n ly once, so that 
no m o r e  than one f i r m  can use J's t e c h n o l o g y .  Thus, the TS's 
b e h a v i o u r  can be d e s c r i b e d  as f o ll ow s: in the f i r s t  pe ri od , 
they c o n s u m e  t h e i r  w e a l t h  and try to sell th e i r  t e c h n o l o g y .  
Th o s e  who s u c c e e d  get a fee in the s e c o n d  period, w h i c h  is 
then ( i m m e d i a t e l y )  c o n s u m e d .  T h is c o n s t r a i n t  on the TS's 
b e h a v i o u r  ca n be f o r m a l i z e d  as
C J2* 6 Jf x j> > 6 j“ 6 > 0 -
h o l d i n g  f o r  all JEM.
One b a s i c  p i c t u r e  e m e r g e s  f r o m  the a b o v e  d e s c r i p t i o n .  In 
o r d e r  to a c h i e v e  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  i n t e r t e m p o r a l  p a t t e r n  of 
c o n s u m p t i o n ,  the T S 's have to sell th e i r  t e c h n o l o g i e s .
C o n s u m e r s ,  on the o t h e r  hand, have to i n v e s t  th e i r  w e a l t h  in 
the a v a i l a b l e  t e c h n o l o g i e s .  H o we ve r, the set of p r o d u c t i o n  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  m a d e  a v a i l a b l e  by the T S ' s  does not e x h a u s t  
the r a n g e  of i n v e s t m e n t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  the c o n s u m e r s .  It 
is a l s o  a s s u m e d  that th e r e  is a t e c h n o l o g y  j=0 w h i c h
p r o v i d e s  c o n s t a n t  r e t u r n s  to scale ( C R S ) . The set of
a v a i l a b l e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  is t h e r e f o r e  T := { 0 , 1 , . . . , m } . T h e  CR S 
t e c h n o l o g y ,  u n l i k e  any ot he r, is f r e e l y  a v a i l a b l e .  No fee 
b e i n g  i m p o s e d  ( i .e ., 6 0 = 0), it g r a n t s  a g i v e n  r e t u r n  at
t=2 f o r  e a ch unit i n v e s t e d  at t=1. T h us the f o l l o w i n g
d e f i n i t i o n  ca n be given.
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The CRS t e c h n o l o g y  p r o v i d e s  a s i mp le b e n c h m a r k  w i t h i n  the 
q u a l i t y  r a n k i n g  of the a v a i l a b l e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  that we are 
go i n g  to impose. The real n u m b e r  r is a s s u m e d  to be g r e a t e r  
than unity. A l t h o u g h  not s t r i c t l y  n e c e s s a r y ,  this is h o w e v e r  
c o n v e n i e n t :  it c a p t u r e s  the idea that a g e n t s  can a l w a y s
i n v e s t  th e i r  w e a l t h  at a g i v e n  p o s i t i v e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e , ( r - 1 ) . 
For n o t a t i o n a l  c o n v e n i e n c e  one can d e f i n e  f Q ( x Q ) := r x Q , and 
s u m m a r i z e  all this in the f o l l o w i n g  a s s u m p t i o n :
A . 3. Th e r e  e x i s t s  a CR S t e c h n o l o g y  Y 0 such that 
o( xo) : “ r x o> r>1 and 6o “ 0-
The CR S t e c h n o l o g y  b e i n g  a l w a y s  f r e e l y  a v a i l a b l e  has 
c l e a r l y  a b e a r i n g  upon the i n v e s t m e n t  cost. As will turn 
out, the e x i s t e n c e  of this fe e s y s t e m  a m o u n t s  to s a y i n g  that 
the unit c a p i t a l  cost to i n v e s t o r s  for jeM is Rj = r/( 1 — 6 j) . 
It is m a de up by the o p p o r t u n i t y  cost r of f o r e g o i n g  
i n v e s t m e n t  in the CRS t e c h n o l o g y ,  and the a c t u a l  cost 6j of 
h a v i n g  a c c e s s  to any t e c h n o l o g y  jeM. The e x o g e n o u s  fee 
b e i n g  the same for all T S 's (i.e., 6j = 6 f o r  all jeM) and 
nil for the CR S t e c h n o l o g y  (i .e ., 6 o = 0 ) , the unit c a p i t a l  
cost w i l 1 be
Rj = r/( 1-6) := R, f o r  all JEM;
R 0 = r-
Each t e c h n o l o g y  is i d e n t i f i e d  by a p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n :  we
can f o r m a l i z e  the idea of q u a l i t y  d i f f e r e n c e s  a c r o s s  
t e c h n o l o g i e s  by g i v i n g  a s i m p l e  r a n k i n g  c r i t e r i o n  for such 
f u n c t i o n s .  In o r d e r  to do so, let us c o n s i d e r  the f o l l o w i n g  
d e fi ni t i o n :
qjCxj) f j ^ x j)/Rj, JET (3)




























































































j y i e l d s  at the inpu t level xj, to the unit cost of
7
c a p i t a l  . U s i n g  the a b o v e  d e f i n i t i o n  of c a p i t a l  cost, we 
have that
q j( x J3 = f jC x J3 / R » J eM C 3')
wh i l e  q 0 ( x 0 )=1 f o r  any a c t i v i t y  level.
We can use q j ( 0) to rank d i f f e r e n t  t e c h n o l o g i e s ^ .  W i t h  no 
loss of g e n e r a l i t y ,  one can o r d e r  t h e m  a c c o r d i n g  as the 
q j( 0) 's are g r e a t e r  (or smaller) than q Q *1, an d t h e r e f o r e  
a s s ume that
q 1 ( 0) >..•> qk(°) > 1 > qk+l(°3 >•••> qm (0)
We now d e f i n e  the sets G : = { j E M | q j ( 0 ) > 1 }  ,
B := {jEM | q j ( 0) <1}, B :*{JEM | q j ( 0)=1}. We a s s u m e  that B is 
empty, so that G and B m a k e  up a p a r t i t i o n  of M such that 
G :={1, . . .,k } an d B :={k + 1, . . . ,m > . By ( d) of a s s u m p t i o n  A . 2 
it f o l l o w s  t r i v i a l l y  that, if q j( 0) >q j + -j C 0) , then f j( x) / x > 
f j + l ( x ) / x ,  f o r  any x>0 and any JEM. Thus we can
u n a m b i g u o u s l y  say that t e c h n o l o g y  j is " b e t t e r "  than 
t e c h n o l o g y  j+1. q □) is t h e r e f o r e  an u n a m b i g u o u s  " q u a l i t y  
i n de x" in this f r a m e w o r k .  Cl e a r l y ,  all t h is a l s o  a p p l i e s  to 
an y p a ir (j,j+1) such that jEG an d ( j+1)£B.
R e m a r k  1: The last a s s u m p t i o n s  br i n g  in the m o d e l  the m a i n
s t r u c t u r a l  d e p a r t u r e  f r o m  D r e z e ' s  o r i g i n a l  work. T h i s  is 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  true as far as the e x i s t e n c e  of an e x o g e n o u s  
fee s y s t e m  is c o n c e r n e d .  Its use to e v a l u a t e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  is 
a ro u g h  s h o r t c u t  to m o d e l i n g  a m a r k e t  for t e c h n o l o g i e s .  In 
the p r e s e n t  f r a m e w o r k  this is u s ed o n l y  to i n t r o d u c e  
a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  ( s e c t i o n  4). U n d e r  this r e s p e c t ,  TS's 
not i n v e s t i n g  in the fi r s t  p e r i o d  is an i n n o c u o u s
a s s u m p t i o n ,  w h i c h  s i m p l i f i e s  the a l ge br a. H o w e v e r ,  m o d e l i n g  




























































































is, in p r i n c i p l e ,  an i n d e p e n d e n t  issue.
As far as the q u a l i t y  r a n k i n g  is c o n c e r n e d ,  the c r i t e r i o n  
we a d o p t e d  is c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  any m o d e l  w i t h  s t r i c t l y  c o n v e x  
p r o d u c t i o n  sets: it is i n t r o d u c e d  here so as to have a re ad y
b e n c h m a r k  in the a n a l y s i s  of the a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  
case. In the p r e v i o u s  e x a m p l e  w h e r e  f j ( x j ) = a j l o g ( x j +  1), 
q j ( G ) =  aj/R, so that a j > R  => j£G. U n d e r  our a s s u m p t i o n s  the 
s t a n d a r d  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  ( o p t i m a l i t y )  c o n d i t i o n  for 
any f i r m  JEM is o b v i o u s l y  gi v e n  by q j ( x j ) = 1 ,  w h i c h  in the 
same e x a m p l e  g i v e s  X j = ( a j - R ) / R  = qj ( 0 ) - 1 .
3. Full information equilibria
In this s e c t i o n  the p o l a r  c a se of c o m p l e t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
will be e x a m i n e d .  At the b e g i n n i n g  of the fi r s t  p e r i o d  the 
m a r k e t s  open. E a ch TS e x h i b i t s  his t e c h n o l o g y ;  c o n s u m e r s  
o b s e r v e  the a v a i l a b l e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  and d e c i d e  w h i c h  fi r m s  
s h o u l d  be set up and what is the a m o u n t  of c a p i t a l  re qu ir ed .
In d o i n g  so, t h ey take into a c c o u n t  that any f i r m  s h ou ld pay
g
a fee on o u t p u t  w h e n  p r o d u c t i o n  is o v e r  and that i n v e s t m e n t  
in the CR S t e c h n o l o g y  is a l w a y s  po s s i b l e .  E a ch f i r m
a c q u i r e s  its c a p i t a l  by i s s u i n g  c l a i m s  on o u t p u t  to be 
d e l i v e r e d  in p e r i o d  t=2, d e f i n e d  as s h a r e s  of the a c tu al 
p r o d u c t i o n ;  c o n s u m e r s  grant that c a p i t a l  by p u r c h a s i n g  those 
a s s e t s  ( c h o o s i n g  a p o r t f o l i o  w h i c h  m a y  i n c l u d e  i n v e s t m e n t  in 
the CRS t e c h n o l o g y )  t r a d i n g  o f f  c u r r e n t  and f u t u r e  
c o n s u m p t i o n ,  w h i l e  TS's c o n s u m e  th e i r  e n d o w m e n t .  W h en the 
share m a r k e t  has cl e a r e d ,  f i r m s  b e g i n  t h e i r  p r o d u c t i o n .  This 
is c o m p l e t e d  at t = 2, w h e n  o u t p u t  is d i s t r i b u t e d  to b o th 
as se t o w n e r s  and s u c c e s s f u l  TS's, and s e co nd p e r i o d  
c o n s u m p t i o n  ta k e s  place; u n s u c c e s s f u l  T S 's - who c o u l d  not 
sell th e i r  t e c h n o l o g i e s  in the fi r s t  p e r i o d  - are a l l o c a t e d  
a zero ( " s u b s i s t e n c e " )  level of c o n s u m p t i o n .
We mo d e l  t h is st or y by l o o k i n g  at c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n s  



























































































a c r o s s  c o n s u m e r s ,  w h i c h  can be s u p p o r t e d  by a share pr ic e 
vect or . C o n s i d e r  a gi v e n  set of e x i s t i n g  f i r m s  ( a c t i v e  
t e c h n o l o g i e s ) ,  the sh ar e a l l o c a t i o n  w h i c h  is a s s o c i a t e d  to 
it and the sh a r e  pr i c e  s y s t e m  w h i c h  s u p p o r t s  that 
a l l o c a t i o n .  T h is is an e q u i l i b r i u m  s i t u a t i o n  if the
f o l l o w i n g  holds: (a) no s h a r e h o l d e r  is w i l l i n g  to in ve st
m o r e  w e a l t h  in any e x i s t i n g  firm, ( b) th e r e  are no i n a c t i v e  
t e c h n o l o g i e s  w h i c h  c o n s u m e r s  m i g h t  w a nt to f u nd w i th 
p o s i t i v e  c a p i t a l  a m o u n t s  and ( c) no c o n s u m e r  is w i l l i n g  to 
tr ad e s h ar es at the go i n g  price.
This e q u i l i b r i u m  is d e c r i b e d  by an a r r a y  of v e c t o r s  in
2
R + , c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to c o n s u m p t i o n  and p r o d u c t i o n  of the n 
a g e n t s  in the two p e ri od s, to w h i c h  a set of e x i s t i n g  fi r m s  
is a s s o c i a t e d .  S u c h  an e q u i l i b r i u m  has to s a t i s f y  c e r t a i n  
c o n d i t i o n s .  In o r d e r  that th e s e  be de r i v e d ,  we take
a d v a n t a g e  of a w o rk by Dr e z e  (1 97 4 ) ,  w h e r e  the f o l l o w i n g  
s t r a t e g y  is s u g g e s t e d .  First, t a k i n g  as g i v e n  the a l l o c a t i o n  
of s h a r e s  a m o n g  a g e n t s  and the p r o d u c t i o n  pl a n s  of all 
e x i s t i n g  f i r m s  but one, the o p t i m a l  c h o i c e  of the r e m a i n i n g  
f i r m  is c o n s i d e r e d  and a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  for that f i r m  is 
de f i n e d .  Se co n d ,  t a k i n g  as gi v e n  the e x i s t i n g  f i rm s' 
d e c i s i o n s  ab o u t  p r o d u c t i o n  plans, the o p t i m a l  a l l o c a t i o n  of 
s h a r e s  a m o n g  a g e n t s  is ex am in ed , and a pr i c e  e q u i 1i b r i u m  for 
this p r o b l e m  is d e fi ne d. Third, th e s e  two e q u i l i b r i u m  
c o n c e p t s  are put t o g e t h e r  to y i e l d  a s t o c k h o l d e r s  ' 
e q u i 1 i b r i u m . The e c o n o m y  c o n s i d e r e d  in this p a p e r  is 
a c t u a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  D r ez e' s. In p a r t i c u l a r ,  the wo r l d  
d e s c r i b e d  here is n o n s t o c h a s t i c ,  w h i c h  s i m p l i f i e s  s o m e w h a t  
the an a l y s i s .  O n c e  a s t o c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i l i b r i u m  has b e en 
de f i n e d ,  its e x i s t e n c e  can q u i t e  s i mp ly be e s t a b l i s h e d  for 






























































































An y e q u i l i b r i u m  must o b v i o u s l y  be fe a s i b l e .  The f e a s i b l e  
set for this e c o n o m y  is d e c r i b e d  by the set of p r o d u c t i o n  
( xj) and c o n s u m p t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  ( c a -̂) w h i c h  satisfy:
E j X j + £ a c a1 < W (4a)
Ea°a2 5 z  x j) C 4b)
xj>0, c a t >0, JET, aEA, t - 1 , 2  (4c)
As is clear, the f e a s i b l e  set e x h i b i t s  some s t a n d a r d  
p r o p e r t i e s .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  it is c o m p a c t  and co nv ex . 
H o we ve r, this set d o es not e x h a u s t i v e l y  d e s c r i b e  the 
r e l e v a n t  c o n s t r a i n t s  un d e r  w h i c h  the e c o n o m y  is o p e r a t i n g .  
A c t u a l l y ,  one has to take into a c c o u n t  that any c o n s u m p t i o n  
and p r o d u c t i o n  p l an m u st be i m p l e m e n t e d  w i t h i n  the e x i s t i n g  
fee s y s t e m  and t h r o u g h  joint stock o w n e r s h i p  of the firms. 
In o t h e r  words, we have to limit o u r s e l v e s  to c o n s i d e r i n g  
the s tock o w n e r s h i p  f e a s i b l e  set of this e c on om y, w h i c h  is a 
(proper) su bs et of the f e a s i b l e  set d e s c r i b e d  by (4) . This 
stock o w n e r s h i p  f e a s i b l e  set is the set of p r o d u c t i o n  and 
c o n s u m p t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  w h i c h  satisfy:
e JETxJ + raEAca1 < w CSa) 
Cj2 < 6fj(xj), all JEM (5b) 
°12 i EjET0i j C x j )  , all i E N (5c) 
EiEN0ij 5 1 > a l l JET ( 5d) 
cati°. xj?°. 0ij>°. all iEN, all JET, t=1,2 (5e)




























































































Cl e a r l y ,  3j( .) is the a g g r e g a t e  a m o u n t  to be p a id out as 
Cnet) d i v i d e n d s ;  0 ^ j is an e l e m e n t  of the ( m + 1 ) x ( n - m )  m a t r i x
i eN 10
0 : * [ 0 ^ j ] j e M , w h i c h  d e s c r i b e s  an a l l o c a t i o n  of s h a r e s  am o n g  
c o n s u m e r s ;  f i n a l l y ,  the p a r a m e t e r  6 is c o n s t r a i n e d  to lie 
in the i n t e r v a l  [0,1] if ( Be) is to be sa ti s f i e d .  U s i n g  the 
v e c t o r  n o t a t i o n  c a := C c a ^ ,c a 2 ) > we can d e f i n e  the set of 
st o c k  o w n e r s h i p  f e a s i b l e  p r o g r a m m e s  as
Z:={z:=( x j , c a ,0) | JET, a E A ; ( S) is s a t i s f i e d )  (6)
T h is set is c l e a r l y  co m p a c t .  It is h o w e v e r  not g e n e r a l l y  
c o n v e x ,  due to the i n d i v i d u a l  c o n s t r a i n t  (5c), i m p o s i n g  that 
the e c o n o m y ' s  real a l l o c a t i o n s  must be a t t a i n e d  t h r o u g h  
sh ar e a l l o c a t i o n s .  T h i s  n o n c o n v e x i t y  ma y be i l l u s t r a t e d  in 
the f o l l o w i n g  w a y ^ V
o o
C o n s i d e r  tw o p o i n t s  z,z EZ, such that xo > x o >0 and
o o
0 i j > © i j > O. A s s u m e  f u r t h e r  that, fo r all JEM, X j =X j= 0, and
[ c i2" 0 i o f o ( x o ) 3 * £ c i 2 “ e i o f o ( xo)3 = °- 
Then, f o r  any pE(0,1)
o o o
P<=i2 + ( 1 - p ) c i 2 - [ p 0 i o + C 1 - p ) 0 i o ] [ p x o + ( 1 - p ) x 0 ]r
o o o
— p C 1 — p ] [ 0 i o ^ x o~ x io^ — 0 i o ^ * i o — x io) ̂  ̂
= p ( 1 - p ) ( x 0 - xo ) ( 0 i o - 0 i o )r> 0
o
He nc e, the ( s t r i c t l y )  c o n v e x  c o m b i n a t i o n  of z an d z does 
not be long to Z .
R e m a r k  2 : The n o n c o n v e x i t y  just c o n s i d e r e d  g i v e s  a r a t i o n a l e  
f o r  the t w o - s t a g e  p r o c e d u r e  s u g g e s t e d  by D r èz e: w h e n  the 
sh ar e a l l o c a t i o n  p r o b l e m  is not e x p l i c i t l y  and s e p a r a t e l y  




























































































the s h a r e h o l d e r s ' .  That is, an e q u i l i b r i u m  w h e r e  the share 
and c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n s  are s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  P a r e t o  o p t i m a l  
c a n n o t  be a c h i e v e d ^ .
Let each s h a r e h o l d e r  b e h a v e  c o m p e t i t i v e l y  and take as 
g i v e n  the unit r e t u r n  on c a p i t a l  paid out by any share. 
Then, i n v e s t m e n t  in a gi v e n  f i r m  is o p t i m a l  to him w h en the 
a v e r a g e  r e t u r n  and the unit cost of c a p i t a l  are equal 
( " a r b i t r a g e "  s o l u t i o n ) ,  w h i c h  is i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  p r o f i t  
m a x i m i z i n g  ( P a r e t o  o p t i m u m ) . T h is i n c o n s i s t e n c y  is 
f o r m a l i z e d  t h r o u g h  a s i mp le game in a p p e n d i x  A. E a ch 
s h a r e h o l d e r  ta k e s  i n to a c c o u n t  the d e p r e s s i n g  e f f e c t  that 
his own i n v e s t m e n t  has on the a v e r a g e  rate of return, but 
take s as gi v e n  the o t h e r  i n v e s t o r s '  b e h a v i o u r .  Indeed, the 
(Nash) s o l u t i o n  to t h is game te nd s to the a r b i t r a g e  s o l u t i o n  
as the n u m b e r  of s h a r e h o l d e r s  goes to i n f i ni ty , wh i l e  the 
P a r e t o  o p t i m u m  f o l l o w s  if such n u m b e r  is set eq u a l  to one 
( c o o p e r a t i v e  s o l u t i o n ) . The n o n c o n v e x i t y  of the 
( s t o c k h o l d e r s ' )  f e a s i b l e  set e n t a i l s  that any e q u i l i b r i u m  
a l l o c a t i o n  will be, at best, c o n s t r a i n e d  P a r e t o  e f f i c i e n t .  
As the game t h e o r e t i c  e x a m p l e  shows, this is a c o n s e q u e n c e  
of the m o d e l ' s  c o m p e t i t i v e  setup. F u r t h e r  c o m m e n t s  on this 
po in t will be o f f e r e d  in r e m a r k  3.
3.2. Pseudoequilibrium
Let us c o n s i d e r  a gi v e n  po in t z = ( [ x j ] j e T >t c a ] a £ A > E Z • To 
this point th e r e  c o r r e s p o n d s  a g i v e n  set of firms, L(z)c_M, 
d e f i n e d  as the set of f i r m s  " e x i s t i n g "  at z: a f i r m  us i n g  
t e c h n o l o g y  JEM ( f i r m  JEM for short) " e x i s t s "  at z if at 
least one c o n s u m e r  ho l d s  p o s i t i v e  s h a r e s  in it, that is 
L ( z ) : = { J E M | I i e N  s.t. 0 i J > O } 1 3 .
Fo r any JEL(z), c o n s i d e r  the c o n s u m p t i o n  and p r o d u c t i o n  
pl a n s  wh i c h  may be a t t a i n e d  by r e d i s t r i b u t i n g  the i n v e s t e d  
c a p i t a l  b e t w e e n  t e c h n o l o g y  j and the s h a r e h o l d e r s '  c u r r e n t  



























































































can be c a r r i e d  out w h i l e  l e a v i n g  u n c h a n g e d  b o t h  the share 
a l l o c a t i o n  and the a m o u n t  of c a p i t a l  i n v e s t e d  in 
t e c h n o l o g i e s  o t h e r  than j. G i v e n  z, any o t h e r  poin t in Z 
g e n e r a t e d  by r e a l l o c a t i n g  r e s o u r c e s  to Cor from) firs t 
p e r i o d  c o n s u m p t i o n  m u st then lie in Fj (z ), to w h i c h  z i t s e l f  
o b v i o u s l y  b e l o n g s .  We t h e r e f o r e  d e f i n e
Fj(z) :- {zEZ |xh « x h , all he T , h*> j ; 0=0} (7)
- 14
The set Fj(z) is c o m p a c t  and c o n v e x  W i t h i n  such a set, we 
are n o w  l o o k i n g  f o r  f i r m  j's p r o d u c t i o n  pl a n s  that w o u l d  be 
a c c e p t e d  as o p t i m a l  by its s h a r e h o l d e r s .  To this end, give n 
m o n o t o n i c i t y  of p r e f e r e n c e s ,  we can d e f i n e  an i n d u c e d  
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  r e p r e s e n t i n g  the c o n s u m e r s '  p r e f e r e n c e s  
o v er a l t e r n a t i v e  p o i n t s  in F j( z) , that is
v ± C c i 1 » x j J := Si jO jC xj ) + r h e T 0 i h 5 h( x h ) J ( 8 )
wh ich, u n d e r  our a s s u m p t i o n s ,  is a c o n t i n u o u s ,  s t r i c t l y
15q u a s i - c o n c a v e  m o n o t o n i c  ( i n c r e a s i n g )  f u n c t i o n  The P a r e t o  
o p t i m a l  a l l o c a t i o n  of c a p i t a l  w i t h i n  Fj(z) can n o w  be 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by n o t i n g  that, gi v e n  the sh ar e a l l o c a t i o n  0, 
an y v a r i a t i o n  in Xj a f f e c t s  s e co nd p e r i o d  c o n s u m p t i o n  of all 
s h a r e h o l d e r s .  Thus, Xj can be t r e a t e d  as a p u b l i c  g o od for 
the s o l u t i o n  of our p r ob le m. F i n d i n g  a P a r e t o  o p t i m a l  
a l l o c a t i o n  w i t h i n  F j ( .) then a m o u n t s  to c o n s i d e r i n g  a p u b l i c  
good e c o n o m y , w h e r e  (a) V (.,.) d e s c r i b e s  the c o n s u m e r s '  
p r e f e r e n c e s  o v e r  on e p r i v a t e  g o od ( c-j) and one p u b l i c  good 
(xj) ; ( b) the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  set b e t w e e n  the p r i v a t e  and the 
p u b l i c  g o od is d e s c r i b e d  by the l i ne ar c o n s t r a i n t
E a e A c a1 + »j < W " E h e T x h , h»-j (9)
A P a r e t o  o p t i m a l  a l l o c a t i o n  can t h e r e f o r e  be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
by s o l v i n g  the f o l l o w i n g  p r o g r a m m e  w . r. t. ( c ^ ^ , X j ) ,  w i th 





























































































s t - Ea£Aca1 + X j  < W - £heT*h>
C 10)
It is well K n o w n  ( e . g . , M a l i n v a u d ,  1972, p.212) that any 
P a r e t o  a l l o c a t i o n  for a p u b l i c  g o o d  e c o n o m y  m u s t  s a t i s f y  the 
e q u a l i t y  b e t w e e n  the sum of the c o n s u m e r s '  m a r g i n a l  r a t e s  of 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  a m o n g  p r i v a t e  and p u b l i c  g o o d s  and the 
m a r g i n a l  rate of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of p r i v a t e  into p u b l i c  
goods. In this p a r t i c u l a r  i n s t a n c e ,  this c o n d i t i o n  b e co me s:
5 '( x j) J-ieNn i j0i j “ 1 (11)
w h e r e  n i j : =n i( c ± -| , x j) =( 6 u 6c ̂ 2 ) / ( <5u ± / i  1) r e p r e s e n t s
c o n s u m e r  ( s h a r e h o l d e r )  i's m a r g i n a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n  rate o v er 
time, e v a l u a t e d  at (cj_-j,Xj), g i v e n  x^ ( ht= j) and 0. E q u a t i o n  
(11) is an o p t i m a l i t y  c o n d i t i o n  on the a m o u n t  of c a p i t a l  Xj 
r e q u i r e d  by an y f i r m  jeL(z) to m a x i m i z e  its s h a r e h o l d e r s '  
we l f a r e ,  gi v e n  the share a l l o c a t i o n  0: it is take n as the
p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i  t ion for f i r m  j. T h is e q u a t i o n  can be 
set in te rm s of q j ( .): by s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  m a n i p u l a t i o n s  one 
o b ta in s:
q j C x j ) -  C r E i E N n i j B i j )  1 ( 1 2 )
wh i c h  a l l o w s  an e a s i e r  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  the s t a n d a r d  
o p t i m a l i t y  c o n d i t i o n ,  q j (. )* 1.
O n ly fi r m s  jGL(z) have b e en c o n s i d e r e d  till now. We now 
b r i e f l y  turn to the r e m a i n i n g  cases. A f i r m  not e x i s t i n g  at 
z, K E M \ L ( z ) , is f o r m a l l y  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  0 ^ * 0  for all iEN. 
W h e n  this is so, xĵ  d i s a p p e a r s  f r o m  all a g e n t s '  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s :  it is not t r a d e d  in the f i c t i t i o u s  p u b l i c  good
e c on om y. Hence, 0 i k = ^» ^ or a 11 iEN, i m p l i e s  x^=0. F i na ll y, 
a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  can be d e f i n e d  a l s o  for the CRS 




























































































c h a r g e s  a fee. The p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  for j=0 is:
r E i 8 N n io a io = 1 C 13J
so that q 0 ( x o ) = 1 - We can at this po in t give an e x p l i c i t  
d e f i n i t i o n  of a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  (D rè ze , 1987, p .272).
Gi v e n  any po i n t  zEZ, a pseudoequilibrium for JET is
a point zEFj(z)cZ, such that
Ca) V U i ,  , x j) > V C cl1 , x j) _> ci1+ nijalj5jCxj)
Ci1 + "i ja ij5 x j) . for all 16N;
Cb) qJ(xJ)-CrI:iENni.|0ij)~1 for JELC z ) ;
Cc) xj = 0 for jEM\L(z ) , and II0X
'"ocr
A p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  is t h e r e f o r e  such that the s h a r e h o l d e r s '  
w e l f a r e  is m a x i m i z e d  (a) by c h o o s i n g  an a p p r o p r i a t e  a c t i v i t y  
level ( b , c ) . F o r m a l l y ,  this is r e a l l y  the s t a n d a r d
d e f i n i t i o n  of a " L i n d a h l  e q u i l i b r i u m "  fo r a p u b l i c  g o od
e c on om y, w h e r e  n ij are " L i n d a h l  p r i c e s " ( e . g . , Mi l l e r o n ,  
1972). One has no w to show that, gi v e n  zeZ ( a nd the r e l a t e d  
shar e a l l o c a t i o n  8), th er e i n d e e d  e x i s t s  a set := { n ^ j | i E N >  
of w e i g h t s  w h i c h  w a r r a n t  e x i s t e n c e  of a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  
for any JET. This is e s t a b l i s h e d  in the f o l l o w i n g
p r o p o s i t i o n .
Proposition 1. U n d e r  a s s u m p t i o n s  A.1 to A . 3, and 
gi v e n  any poin t zEZ such that £ i e N c i 1 > 0 > ^ or a n y 
JET:
(a) th e r e  e x i s t s  a po in t zEFj(z) w h i c h  is a
p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m ;
( b) z is a P a r e t o  o p t i m u m  w i t h i n  Fj(z) ;
( c) to any such o p t i m u m  one can a s s o c i a t e  a set of 
w e i g h t s  n J , such that (z,n^) is a 
p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m .




























































































f o l l o w s  by s t a n d a r d  a r g u m e n t s 1 6 . It is s i m p l y  a v e r s i o n  of 
Dr è z e  ' s T h e o r e m  3.1 ( Drèze, 1907, p.273).
3.3. Price equilibrium
We now t u rn to the i n v e s t o r s '  o p t i m a l  c h o i c e s  g i v e n  the 
f i r m s '  p r o d u c t i o n  pl ans. S t a r t i n g  f r o m  any po i n t  zEZ, 
a l t e r n a t i v e  p o i n t s  can be g e n e r a t e d  via a l t e r n a t i v e  
a l l o c a t i o n s  of shares, i.e. t h r o u g h  c h a n g e s  in 0 m a t c h e d  by 
v a r i a t i o n s  in the c o n s u m e r s '  fi r s t  p e r i o d  c o n s u m p t i o n .  
F o l l o w i n g  a g a i n  Dr è z e  ( 1987, p .275) we d e n o t e  by E( z) the 
set of stock o w n e r s h i p  f e a s i b l e  p r o g r a m m e s  w h i c h  ca n be 
o b t a i n e d  by r e a l l o c a t i n g  fi r s t  p e r i o d  c o n s u m p t i o n  and 
sh ar es :
E ( i ) : = { z £ Z | x j » X j ,  all JET} (16)
We can treat E(z) as the set of f e a s i b l e  a l l o c a t i o n s  for 
an e x c h a n g e  e c on om y, w h e r e  fi rs t p e r i o d  c o m m o d i t y  and s h ar es
are the c o m m o d i t i e s  b e i n g  traded. T h is set is c o m p a c t  and 
- 17
convex, Xj (JET) b e i n g  gi v e n  . We n o w  look fo r the 
c o n s u m p t i o n  - share a l l o c a t i o n s  w h i c h  are P a r e t o  o p t i m a l  
w i t h i n  E ( z ) . L i ke in the f o r m e r  case, we can i d e n t i f y  each 
c o n s u m e r ' s  p r e f e r e n c e s  o v e r  a l l o c a t i o n s  in E( z) by the 
i n d u c e d  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n
W l( c i 1 > 0 i ) := Ui Cc i, , E j E T B i j B j C J j ) ]  (17)
wh er e ^ i : ^ i j ] j g T the C m + 1) v e c t o r  of s h ar es t r a d e d  by 
c o n s u m e r  i. T h is f u n c t i o n  is c o n t i n u o u s ,  s t r i c t l y  q u a s i ­
c o n c a v e  and ( m o n o t o n i c a 1 ly) i n c r e a s i n g .  The set of P a r e t o  
o p t i m a l  share a l l o c a t i o n s ,  gi v e n  a po i n t  zEZ at w h i c h  xj =x j 
for all J E T , c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  the set of P a r e t o  o p t i m a l  
a l l o c a t i o n s  of a f i c t i t i o u s  e c o n o m y  such that: (a) E(z)




























































































t r a d e r s '  p r e f e r e n c e s .  G i v e n  the o u t l i n e d  f e a t u r e s  of and
E ( z ) , such an a l l o c a t i o n  exists, and can be d e c e n t r a l i z e d  by 
an a p p r o p r i a t e  p r i c e  system. It is t h e r e f o r e  t e r m e d  pr ic e 
e q u i l i b r i u m . We now, first, d e f i n e  a p r i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  then 
e s t a b l i s h  its e x i s t e n c e ,  and f i n a l l y  look m o r e  p r e c i s e l y  
into its f e a t u r e s .
To d e f i n e  a p r i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  c o n s i d e r  the f i c t i t i o u s  
e c o n o m y  r e f e r r e d  to above, w h e r e  ( m + 2) c o m m o d i t i e s  are 
traded. We d e f i n e  a pr i c e  v e c t o r  p£R+ + + 1” fo r this ec o n o m y ,  
and n o r m a l i z e  the p r i c e  of the c o n s u m p t i o n  g o o d  p c = 1 1 0 . The 
m a r k e t  c l e a r i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  are give n by
*-ieN0i j -  1 (18a)
E a8Ac a1 * w ~ E J8TXJ M B b )
The f o l l o w i n g  d e f i n i t i o n  can now be given:
■B-
A price equilibrium is a p a ir (z ,
-> -
pc =1, z e Z , such that:
(a) f o r  all i 8 N , W 1[ c i 1 ( B i ) >
■H- # *
c i1+ E ^8Ts ijPj > c il+ E J8T0 ljPj;
(b) E i E N c i 1 * w - e J E T X j ;
( c) for all JET such that xj>0, ^ i £ N 0 i j = 1 *
T h is is the d e f i n i t i o n  of a c o m p e t i t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  for the 
e x c h a n g e  e c o n o m y  d e s c r i b e d  by (16) an d (1?). We now 
e s t a b l i s h  its e x i s t e n c e ,  i.e. that of a P a r e t o  o p t i m a l  share 
a l l o c a t i o n  ( a n d  of a p r i c e  v e c t o r  wh i c h  s u p p o r t s  i t ) , give n 
the f i rm s' p r o d u c t i o n  plans. This is d o ne in the f o l l o w i n g  
p r o p o s i t i o n :
Proposition 2. U n d e r  a s s u m p t i o n s  A.1 to A . 3, gi ve n
an y zEZ such that £■}.ĝ c;i. i >0 :
(a) there e x i s t s  a pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m ;
( b) any pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m  is a P a r e t o  o p ti mu m;
p * ) 8 E ( ^ ) x R + + + 2 ,
i •}£




























































































( c) to any P a r e t o  o p t i m u m  z E E ( z ) one can a s s o c i a t e
* m + 2  * *
a pr i c e  v e c t o r  p ER+ + such that ( z ,p ) is a
pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m .
G i v e n  c o n v e x i t y  and c o m p a c t n e s s  of E ( z ) , this r e s u l t  f o l l o w s  
by s t a n d a r d  c o m p e t i t i v e  ar gu m e n t s .
We no w c h a r a c t e r i z e  a pr ic e e q u i l i b r i u m .  To do so, n o t i c e  
that, at such an e q u i l i b r i u m ,  the o p t i m a l  share p o r t f o l i o  
fo r e a ch s h a r e h o l d e r  m u st s a t i s f y  (D rè ze , 1987, p .275):
< .
6 W 1/ 6 c i 1 ” PJ
if-
with e q u a l i t y  if 0^j>O, as the s t a n d a r d  m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  
pr i c e  r a t i o  o p t i m a l i t y  rule. In the p r e s e n t  f r a m e w o r k  this 
b e c o m e  s
n i S j Û j )  < Pj ( 19)
wh e r e  n i : “ n i( c-̂ -j , 0-^) is the usual m a r g i n a l  rate of
«-
s u b s t i t u t i o n  o v e r  time, e v a l u a t e d  at ( c i1>0i)> gi ve n 
x :■[ xj] j 6j . The e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  (19) e n t a i l s  that 
p o s i t i v e  t r a d e s  of shares, 0ij>Q, take pl a c e  at a price
pj= riiSjtxj), all JET, all i £ N .
if- *
Hence, pj and Xj b e i n g  g i v e n  to any ag en t iEN, n-ĵ i_ŝ  eq u a l
^ if-
for all c o n s u m e r s  at â  p r i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m , n^= n , all isN. 
This is not su r p r i s i n g :  in e q u i l i b r i u m ,  the m a r g i n a l  rate of
s u b s t i t u t i o n  o v e r  time m u st be the same to all c o n s u m e r s .  
Si n c e  5j(0)=0, the s h a r e s  JET such that X j =0 d i s a p p e a r  f r o m  
the ag en ts ' u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  an d are not traded: x j =0
i*




























































































3.4. Full information equilibrium
We now s p e c i f y  a f u ll i n f o r m a t i o n  s t o c k h o l d e r s '  
e q u i l i b r i u m  (FIE) f o r  our ec o n o m y .  A FIE is b o th a 
p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  for e a ch f i r m  and a p r i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m  for 
the c o n s u m e r s .  It can t h e r e f o r e  be d e f i n e d  as f o ll ow s:
A (f ul l i n f o r m a t i o n )  stockholders' equilibrium is a
po in t z*EZ such that:
1 *(a) for e v e r y  JET, th e r e  e x i s t s  a set of w e i g h t s  n J
such that (z ,n ) is a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  j;
-a- m + 2
( b) th er e e x i s t s  a pr i c e  s y s t e m  p ER+ + , such that
•a- *
(z ,p ) is a pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m .
We have to e s t a b l i s h  the e x i s t e n c e  of a FIE, and then
c h a r a c t e r i z e  it. B e f o r e  d o i n g  so, h o we ve r, let us re c a p  the
g e n e r a l  a r g u m e n t  f o l l o w e d  so far. C o n s i d e r  an y point z£Z
such that E i £ N C i i > 0  and any JET. Un d e r  p r o p o s i t i o n  1, one
can a s s o c i a t e  at z a set of w e i g h t s  :={ n ^ j  | ieN} such that
( z ,n J ) , z e Fj (z ), is a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m .  On the o t h e r  hand, 
- a- -
by p r o p o s i t i o n  2, to z there c o r r e s p o n d  a l s o  a po in t z EE(z)
m + 2 -K- *
and a pr i c e  v e c t o r  p ER+ + such that ( z ,p ) is a pr i c e
e q u i l i b r i u m .  The l a t t e r  a l so i d e n t i f i e s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  set 
■H- # * *
of w e i g h t s  n := {n i| i6 N> , h a v i n g  the p r o p e r t y  that n^ = n for
all iEN. As a n a t u r a l  c o n s i s t e n c y  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  we t h e r e f o r e
~ -j -a-
e x p e c t  that fl - (1 f o r  all JGT at a FIE.
The f o l l o w i n g  p r o p o s i t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e s  e x i s t e n c e  of a FIE:
Proposition 3. U n d e r  a s s u m p t i o n s  A.1 to A . 3, there 
e x i s t s  a f u ll i n f o r m a t i o n  ( s t o c k h o l d e r s ' )
e q u i l i b r i u m .
See Dr è z e  (1 90 7) , T h e o r e m  3.3, f o r  a p r o o f  of this 
p r o p o s  it i o n .
*
C o n s i d e r  n o w  a FIE, z EZ. It can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 




























































































f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  m u st hold at a FIE:
* #
(a) n i j = n » all i E N , all JET, as a p u r e l y  FIE c o n d i t i o n :  
each a g e n t ' s  m a r g i n a l  rate of s u b s t i t u t i o n ,  n^C c-̂  <j , 8, x) must 
s a t i s f y  b o th pr i c e  and p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s ;
* -«■
( b) 5 j ( x j ) n  ^ i e N ® ì j “ 1, as a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  
h o l d i n g  for all JET such that 0 i j > O  f o r  some ieN;
* *
( c) n 5 j(xj) = pj, as a pr ic e e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n ,
•M- #
h o l d i n g  for all JET such that x j >0 and 0 ^ j > O  f o r  some iEN;
■a-
( d) ^ i E N 0 i j = 1, as a pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n ,  h o l d i n g
■fr
for a l l  jsT s u c h  t h a t  X j > 0 .
By c o m b i n i n g  th e s e  f e a t u r e s ,  one o b t a i n s  the f o l l o w i n g  
n o t e w o r t h y  resu lt s, s u m m a r i z e d  in p r o p o s i t i o n  P.4.
Proposition 4. U n d e r  a s s u m p t i o n s  A.1 to 
f o l l o w i n g  h o l d s  at a FIE:
A . 3, t he
( i)
( ii)
n = 1/r for x o >0; fo r xo =0, n <1/r. 
D e f i n e  Xj by q j (x )= 1:  then, Xj>0, all
and x j = G , all jEB. If n 
all JEM, an d L ( z * ) - G. If
□ < X j <Xj, all JEG;
JEG,
1/r, then x .» = x j , 
n < 1/r, then:
j = x^, all JEB; L ( z ) c_G .
( iii) For all j EL( z ), E i £ N 0 i j * 1 » and Pj = 5 j(Xj).ii .
For all jfcL(z ), x j “ 0 ij~°> all ieN.
( iv) z* is c o n s t r a i n e d  ( a n d  not fully) P a r e t o
e f f i c i e n t .
The p r o o f  is g i v e n  in A p p e n d i x  B. We b r i e f l y  c o m m e n t  on each 
poin t s e p a r a t e l y .  P o i n t  ( i) is i m p l i e d  by the c e r t a i n  
e n v i r o n m e n t  a g e n t s  face: it is the us ua l F i s h e r i a n  c o n d i t i o n  
for i n t e r t e m p o r a l  m a x i m i z a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
c o r n e r  s o l u t i o n s .  Po i n t  ( ii) is a s t a t e m e n t  of full 




























































































"g oo d" fi r m s  are served. The p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n ,  
t o g e t h e r  w i th shar e m a r k e t  cl e a r i n g ,  le a d s  to a P a r e t o  
o p t i m a l  p r o d u c t i o n  level. Po in t ( iii) is an i m p l i c a t i o n  of 
the pric e e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n .  The m a r k e t  c l e a r i n g  share 
pr i c e  is, not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  the f i r m ' s  value. F i na ll y, 
P a r e t o  o p t i m a l i t y  ( p o i n t  ( i v ) ) d e s e r v e s  some m o r e  d e t a i l e d  
r e m a r k  s .
R e m a r k  3: By p o i n t  (ii), p r o d u c t i o n  is c l e a r l y  e f f i c i e n t  at
a FIE. Ho w e v e r ,  c o n s u m p t i o n  is not f u ll y, but o n ly
c o n s t r a i n e d  e f f i c i e n t :  e a ch agent i£N c h o o s e s  a ( f i r s t
# -
period) c o n s u m p t i o n  level Cj_<|<ci<|, the P a r e t o  o p t i m a l  level. 
T h is can be seen in the f o l l o w i n g  f i g u r e  1, w h e r e  for 
s i m p l i c i t y ' s  sake we c o n s i d e r  a f i r m  JEM at a FIE w h e r e  
X q -O, x j > 0 and
On the top ri g h t  h a nd side we r e p r e s e n t  net d i v i d e n d s  for 
f i r m  j, $ j ( x j ) : * ( 1 - 6 ) f j ( x j ) . On the b o t t o m  ri gh t hand side 
the i n d i f f e r e n c e  c u r v e s  r e p r e s e n t s  i n d u c e d  u t i l i t y  in the 
( c ^ ,xj) space, w h i l e  on the b o t t o m  left h a nd side the
i n d i f f e r e n c e  c u r v e s  r e p r e s e n t  "a c t u a l "  u t i l i t y  in the
( c <l,c 2 ) space. In the graph, we can i d e n t i f y  the FIE by a
* -H- *
c o n s u m p t i o n  v e c t o r  ( c i ^ c - ^ )  and an a c t i v i t y  level Xj. The 
f o l l o w i n g  s h ou ld be noti ce d.
(a) Xj is P a r e t o  o p ti ma l: ac tu al ly , <5j(xj)s=r, i.e.
q j C x j ) - 1 ;
( b) by p r o p o s i t i o n  4, the e q u i l i b r i u m  shar e pr i c e  is
* -a-
equa l to the f i r m ' s  value: pj= £>j(xj)/r. T h i s  i m p l i e s  that
the left hand b u d g e t  line has a slop e ( d c ^ / d c 2 ) “ -(1/r)
( s o l i d  line);
( c) if the sh a r e  a l l o c a t i o n  was e x o g e n o u s l y  given, the
left h a nd b u d g e t  line w o u l d  have a sl o p e  ( d c ^ / d c 2 )
*  -  -
C x j / 5 j ( x j ) ]  ( d o t t e d  l i n e ) . In that case, a fi r s t  p e r i o d  
-a- *- #
c o n s u m p t i o n  of Cii>Ci-| is f u l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  Xj and c^2*
One m i g h t  ask wh y ( c) d o es not h o ld w h e n  a shar e m a r k e t
is e x p l i c i t l y  a l l o w e d  for. The a n s w e r  is that, w h en b o th




























































































the s h a r e h o l d e r s '  a v e r a g e  e v a l u a t i o n  are i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th 
each other. A c t u a l l y ,  c o n s i d e r  any s t r i c t l y  c o n c a v e
c o n t i n u o u s l y  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  f u n c t i o n  f( x) , such that ther eO O 4.
e x i s t s  a valu e x >0 fo r w h i c h  f ' (x )=a>0; surely, if x 




























































































( s t o c k  o w n e r s h i p )  f e a s i b l e  set Z r e f l e c t s  the fact that,
w h i l e  f i r m s  so lv e the f o r m e r  k i nd of pr o b l e m ,  s h a r e h o l d e r s
solv e the latter: w h en there is c o m p e t i t i v e  shar e ma rk et ,
19
s h a r e h o l d e r s  f a ce a sh ar e a l l o c a t i o n  p r o b l e m  of th e i r  own 
D r e z e ' s  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o v e r c o m e s  this i n c o n s i s t e n c y  by 
r e q u i r i n g  that e a ch side, g i v e n  the o t h e r  ' s p l a n s , be
m a x i m i z i n g .  Thus we have t a n g e n c y  e q u i l i b r i a  f o r  b o th
20
c o n s u m e r s  ( e ^ , e 2 ) and fo r f i r m s  ( eg) . H o we ve r, this
it
i m p l i e s  that, g i v e n  Xj, the sh a r e  value in e a c h  c o n s u m e r ' s
it it
b u d g e t  ( e v a l u a t e d  at the f i r m ' s  value: 0 ^ j g j ( x j ) / r ) is
l a r g e r  than the c a p i t a l  a m o u n t  ow n e d  by the same c o n s u m e r
it it
( G ^ j X j ) .  Hence, c o n s u m p t i o n  is not P a r e t o  o p ti ma l.
The TS ' s c o n s u m p t  ion
As a fi n a l  c o m m e n t  to this section, it is c l e a r  that in a 
FI E the T S 's are p a id a c c o r d i n g  to the a c t i v i t y  level of 
the t e c h n o l o g i e s  t h ey sell. G i v e n  m o n o t o n i c i t y  of th e i r  
p r e f e r e n c e s ,  the e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n s u m p t i o n  of e a ch TS j£M will 
sat i sfy
■it it it
EjEMcj1 “ w “ <riENci1 + tjETxj> (20a)
c j2 = 6f jC x j) ( 20b)
The t e c h n o l o g y  s e l l e r s  are a p a s s i v e  c o m p o n e n t  of the 
e c o n o m y .  T h ey do not m a k e  any r e l e v a n t  d e c i s i o n ,  but have an 
i n c e n t i v e  to sell bad t e c h n o l o g i e s  in the a s y m m e t r i c  
i n f o r m a t i o n  case. T h is is what we now t u rn to.
4. Equilibria with asymmetric information
We b e g i n  this s e c t i o n  by a s s u m i n g  that, in a d d i t i o n  to 
the C R S  t e c h n o l o g y ,  th er e are only two t e c h n o l o g i e s ,  and 
t h e r e f o r e  two ty p e s  of f i r m s  w h i c h  can p o s s i b l y  be 




























































































A . 4. E a ch ag e n t  JEM is e n d o w e d  w i t h  a p r o d u c t i o n  
p o s s i b i l i t y  set Yj, such that:
Yj= Y g , for all j E G ;
Yj= Yb , for all j E B .
This a s s u m p t i o n  a l l o w s  a s i m p l e r  a n a l y t i c a l  t r e a t m e n t  of the 
a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  case.
The q u e s t i o n  we p o se is the f o l l o w i n g :  what h a p p e n s  if 
the m a r k e t  c a n n o t  p e r c e i v e  the d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  
t e c h n o l o g i e s .  In ge n e r a l ,  the r e a s o n  fo r a g e n t s  b e i n g  u n a b l e  
to d i s t i n g u i s h  g o o d  f r o m  bad q u a l i t y  is that i n f o r m a t i o n  is 
co st ly . Thus, we have an i m p l i c i t  a s s u m p t i o n :  it is
p r o h i b i t i v e l y  c o s t l y  to d i s s e m i n a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n .  E a ch TS 
kn o w s  the t e c h n o l o g y  he is about to sell, but n e i t h e r  can he 
p r o f i t a b l y  signal, no r can the m a r k e t  screen, this 
t e c h n o l o g y .  O u t s i d e r s  o n l y  k n ow that th er e are " g o o d ” and 
"bad" t e c h n o l o g i e s  on sale. We f o l l o w  a " b o u n d e d
r a t i o n a l i t y "  a p p r o a c h  in a s s u m i n g  that they do not k n ow the 
" t ru e" q u a l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  The l a t t e r  is d e s c r i b e d  by the 
p a r a m e t e r  a : = ( k / m ) >0, the a p r io ri p r o b a b i l i t y  that a 
t e c h n o l o g y  ( i n d e p e n d e n t l y )  dr a w n  at r a n d o m  be "good". Each 
c o n s u m e r  iEN d o es not k n o w  such p a r a m e t e r  and has a give n 
po in t e x p e c t a t i o n  on its value, . The v e c t o r  of the 
c o n s u m e r s '  s u b j e c t i v e  q u a l i t y  e v a l u a t i o n s  is a : = [a i]ieN- 
C o n s u m e r s ,  w h en f a c e d  w i th u n c e r t a i n  o u t c o m e s ,  are a s s u m e d  
to be e x p e c t e d  u t i l i t y  m a x i m i z e r s :  the i n f o r m a t i o n a l
a s y m m e t r y  i m p l i e s  that the ag en ts ' c h o i c e s  are r e s t r i c t e d  
b e t w e e n  the safe t e c h n o l o g y  j=0 and a t e c h n o l o g y  ( c a l l e d  u, 
u E M ) , wh o s e  q u a l i t y  is un ce r t a i n .  The a c t u a l  q u a l i t y  of a 
t e c h n o l o g y  is o n ly r e v e a l e d  w h e n  p r o d u c t i o n  is c o m p l e t e d  and 
o u t p u t  is d e l i v e r e d .  The f o l l o w i n g  a s s u m p t i o n  d e s c r i b e s  the 
e c o n o m y ' s  i n f o r m a t i o n a l  stru ct ur e.
A . 5. No ag e n t  iE N can o b s e r v e  the p r o d u c t i o n  set Yj.




























































































all a g e n t s  at t=2 . F o r  e a ch i£N, the s u b j e c t i v e
2
q u a l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  is [ a t ,( 1- a ^ )] £ ( 0, 1 ) , w i th
r e s p e c t  to w h i c h  he a c ts as an e x p e c t e d  u t i l i t y  
m a x i m i z e r .  The o b j e c t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  is [ a , ( 1 - a ) ] ,  
a : =( k /m) .
We no w a p p l y  the f o r m e r  c o n c e p t s  of p s e u d o -  and p r i c e  
e q u i l i b r i a  to this new s i t u a t i o n ,  and f i n a l l y  d e f i n e  an 
a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  ( s t o c k h o l d e r s ' )  e q u i l i b r i u m  (AIE).
4.1. Pseudoequi1ibrium
C o n s i d e r  any g i v e n  poin t zEZ. A set of e x i s t i n g  
fi rms, L ( z ) c M  and an a l l o c a t i o n  8 of s h a r e s  a c r o s s  a g e n t s  
c o r r e s p o n d  to such po in t. S i n c e  q u a l i t y  is r e v e a l e d  o n l y  at 
t=2, all e x i s t i n g  f i r m s  look al i k e  f r o m  ou t s i d e .  C o n s i d e r  
an y of them, u E L ( z ) : its o p t i m a l  p r o d u c t i o n  p l an m u st be
c h o s e n  ( a nd c a r r i e d  out) w h i l e  i g n o r i n g  the q u a l i t y  of the 
t e c h n o l o g y .  Its p r o b a b i l i t y  of be i n g  " g oo d" is d i f f e r e n t l y  
e v a l u a t e d  by the s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  each of w h o m  has his own 
s u b j e c t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n  a ^ E ( 0 , 1 ) .  Hence, f i r m  u's o p t i m a l  
p r o d u c t i o n  plan ( g i v e n  the sh ar e a l l o c a t i o n  8 and the o t h e r  
f i r m s '  p r o d u c t i o n  plans) m u st lie in the set
F u ( z) :={ z E Z  | x h = x h all heM, h*=u; 8=8} (21)
As in the full i n f o r m a t i o n  case, F u (z) is a c o n v e x  and 
c o m p a c t  set. R e c a l l i n g  D r e z e ' s  p r o c e d u r e ,  we now look for 
the f i r m ' s  p r o d u c t i o n  p l a n s  that y i e l d  the h i g h e s t
( e x p e c t e d )  u t i l i t y  to the s h a r e h o l d e r s .  The a g e n t s  ' i n d u c e d  
u t i l i t y  is as fo l l o w s :
V C°ii,xu);= “ i - U i C c ü ,  0 iuO g( x u) +K] +



























































































w h e r e  K := E h e T 0 i u $ h ( x h ) » h^u. it is c o n t i n u o u s ,  s t r i c t l y  
q u a s i - c o n c a v e  an d ( m o n o t o n i c a l l y )  i n c r e a s i n g .  We c o n s i d e r  
the f i c t i t i o u s  p u b l i c  good e c o n o m y  w h e r e  c^ ( p r i v a t e  good) 
and x u ( p u b l i c  good) are traded; F u (z) r e p r e s e n t s  the 
f e a s i b l e  set and V (.,.) ag e n t  i's (i£N) u t il it y. O p t i m a l  
a l l o c a t i o n s  f o r  such an e c o n o m y  are the s o l u t i o n s  of the 
f o l l o w i n g  p r o g r a m m e :
Max ^ i £ N M 1V 1 C ,x u) 
s • t • *-aEAca1+ x u -  w - *-hETxh> t̂=u
( 23)
An y s o l u t i o n  ( c ^ ,x u ) s a t i s f i e s  the fi r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n :
SgC x u) • t i £ N a in i g B iu + 5| Ĉ x u) .Zl e N C 1 - a l) n i b 0 l u =1 (24)
wh e r e  ^ i j - = n i t c ^y ,5j ( x u ) ] is the c o n s u m e r ' s  m a r g i n a l  rate 
of s u b s t i t u t i o n  o v e r  time, ( 6 u ̂  / 6c ̂ g) / ( 6 u i / 6c i y) , e v a l u a t e d  
at ( c i 1 » 3 j( x u ) ] , j=g,b, g i v e n  x^ ( hf=u) and 9. More 
pr ec i s e l y ,  if we d e f i n e  U£ j : =  u ̂  C c ̂  ̂ , ® i j § j ( x u)+K] , we have
j :*( 6 u i j / 6 c i 2 ) / [ a i( 6 u ifi/ 6 c i 1 ) +
( 1 - a ± ) ( 6 u i b / 6 c i y) ] (25)
Hence, is the rate at w h i c h  c o n s u m e r  iEN w o u l d  trad e off
c u r r e n t  vs f u t u r e  c o n s u m p t i o n  if the a c t u a l  q u a l i t y  t u rn ed 
out to be j = g,b in the s e c o n d  period, give n his i g n o r i n g  
such q u a l i t y  w h e n  m a k i n g  his d e c i s i o n  in the fi r s t  period.
L i ke in the f u ll i n f o r m a t i o n  case, x u is the e q u i l i b r i u m  
a m o u n t  of c a p i t a l  w h i c h  m a x i m i z e s  the s h a r e h o l d e r s '  w e l f a r e  
give n the share a l l o c a t i o n  and the q u a l i t y  e v a l u a t i o n  v e c t o r  
a. T h er ef or e, x u is the p r o d u c t i o n  p l an that the 
s h a r e h o l d e r s  of an e x i s t i n g  f i r m  u ( g i v e n  th e i r  i g n o r a n c e  of 
the f i r m ' s  a c t u a l  q u al it y) w o u 1d a c ce pt a s opt i m a 1 . It
d e f i n e s  an a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  (AI) p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  for 




























































































*iENSlC><u)0 i u = 1 (26)
w h e r e  £}{(.): = a i 8 g ( .)n ^ g + ( . ) is e a c h  s h a r e h o l d e r ' s  
e x p e c t e d  m a r g i n a l  e v a l u a t i o n  of $ u ( .) . If we s i m i l a r l y  
d e f i n e
qi( •) :=“ i q e C - ) n i g -f( 1 - a ± ) q b ( .)nlb
we can a l s o  w r i t e  the p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  as
z i e N q i t x u ) B i u "  1/r ( 27)
O n l y  f i r m s  j £ L ( z ) c M  h a ve b e en c o n s i d e r e d  so far. For the 
t e c h n o l o g i e s  not b e l o n g i n g  to L ( z ) , w h at has b e en said in 
the f u ll i n f o r m a t i o n  c a se a p p l i e s  here: 0 i u =O f o r  all i£N 
i m p l i e s  x u = 0. As to the CRS te ch n o l o g y ,  it is f u l l y  K n o w n  by 
ag en ts . Hence, the p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  is the same 
as (13), i . e . ,
r E i c N n io ® i o  = 1 C 2 0 )
H e re is the e x p l i c i t  d e f i n i t i o n  of an AI p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m :
An ( a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n )  p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  for an 
u n r e c o g n i z a b l e  f i r m  u£M, gi v e n  an e v a l u a t i o n  v e c t o r  
a, is a poin t z £ F u( z ) , zEZ, such that
(a) V l( c i 1 ,x u ) > V l( c l 1 ,xu )
” > + [ ciinigSgt x u ) +( 1-cti) n i b Bb ( x u ) ] 0 lu >
c ± 1 +[ a i n i £ 3 £ ( x u ) +( 1-a*) > H b S b ( x u ) ] i i u , 
f o r  all i E N ;
( b) £i £ N 9  i( x u^ 0 i u “ 1/r, «11 u E L( z ) ;
( c) x u - 0 f o r  u E M \ L ( z ) and r t i c N n i o e io * 1 •
w h i c h  has the same L i n d a h 1- e q u i 1i b r i u m  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  as in 




























































































p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  can no w be e s t a b l i s h e d :
Proposition 5. U n d e r  a s s u m p t i o n s  A.1 to A . 5, and 
g i v e n  any po in t z6Z such that EieNCi.<|>0, fo r any 
u8 M :
(a) th er e e x i s t s  a po in t z E F u ( z ) w h i c h  is a 
p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m ;
( b) z is a P a r e t o  o p t i m u m  w i t h i n  F u( z ) ;
( c) to any such o p t i m u m  one can a s s o c i a t e  a
set of w e i g h t s  f]U : j j i 6N , j - g , b }  such that
(z,FIU) is an AI p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  fo r u.
The p r o o f  of this p r o p o s i t i o n  is g i v e n  in A p p e n d i x  C.
4.2. Price equilibrium
We turn to the i n v e s t o r s '  o p t i m a l  c h o i c e s  gi v e n  the 
f i r m s '  p r o d u c t i o n  plans. In this AI case, we c o n s i d e r  a 
po in t z £ Z , and d e f i n e  the set of f e a s i b l e  share a l l o c a t i o n s  
g i v e n  z. This is
E ( z ) : = { z E Z | x h * x h , all heT} (29)
L i ke before, we can trea t E(z) as the set of f e a s i b l e  
a l l o c a t i o n s  f o r  an e c o n o m y  wh e r e  f i r s t  p e r i o d  c o n s u m p t i o n  
and the (m+1) s h ar es are traded. S u c h  set is c o m p a c t  and 
co nv ex , x^ (all heT) b e i n g  given. In this AI case, however, 
any f i r m  u£M is i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  for any other: s h ar es in
d i f f e r e n t  f i r m s  are r e a l l y  the same c o m m o d i t y  for each 
c o n s u m e r ' s  st a n d p o i n t .
Now, c o n s u m e r  i's i n d u c e d  u t i l i t y  is
W 1 C c i i >0 i ) : =  o i . u j l c i i ,  £ u E M 0 iu§£( x u J + e i o r x o] +




























































































wh er e, f o r  e a ch uEM, 0 1 u 3 j C x u ) is the r e t u r n  of f i r m  j, 
j “ g,b. T h is f u n c t i o n  is c o n t i n u o u s ,  s t r i c t l y  q u a s i - c o n c a v e  
an d ( m o n o t o n i c a l l y )  i n c r e a s i n g .  The set of P a r e t o  o p t i m a l  
share a l l o c a t i o n s  u n d e r  A I , g i v e n  the c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  -
the AI pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m  set - c o r r e s p o n d s  t h e r e f o r e to the
set of P a r e t o  a l l o c a t i o n s of the c o m p e t i t i v e e c o n o m y
d e s c r i b e d  by (29) an d (30) We have the usual m a r k e t
c l e a r i n g  c o n d i t i o n s
t i e N s luî 1 . all uEM (31a)
r i E N e io< 1 (31b)
E a E A c a1< w - E h E T x h ( 31c)
and a g a i n  n o r m a l i z e  for p c = 1, wh i l e  w o r k i n g  w i th price
v e c t o r s  p E R ++ The f o l l o w i n g  d e f i n i t i o n  can n o w  be given:
An ( a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n )  price equilibrium is a
* * - m +2
p a ir (z ,p ) 6 E ( z ) x R ++ , p c ~1, zEZ, such that:
(a) fo r all ieN, W lC c l 1 ,0i ) > W i( c * 1 ,B*) =>
-a- *
c i1+ E uelle iuPu + 0 ioPo > c i1+Euell0 iuPu + 0 ioPo;
Cb) E a E A c a 1 “ w ” E h e T x h5
-  #
( c) for all hET such that xh>0, ^ i £ N 0 i h = 0 -
The e x i s t e n c e  of a pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m  is n o w  e s t a b l i s h e d  in 
the f o l l o w i n g  p r o p o s i t i o n .
Proposition 6. U n d e r  a s s u m p t i o n s  A.1 to A . 5, gi v e n  
any po in t zEZ such that ^ i e N c i 1 > 0 »
(a) th er e e x i s t s  a p r i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m ;
( b) an y pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m  is a P a r e t o  o p t i m u m  w i t h i n  
E( z) ;
* -
( c) to an y such o p t i m u m  z EE(z) on e ca n a s s o c i a t e  a
#■ m + 2 *■ ■*
p r i c e  v e c t o r  p ER++ , such that ( z ,p ) is a




























































































The p r o o f  of this p r o p o s i t i o n  is g i v e n  in A p p e n d i x  C. 
A l t h o u g h  p r o p o s i t i o n  6 has qu i t e  the same w o r d i n g  as 
p r o p o s i t i o n  2, its m e a n i n g  is a c t u a l l y  d i f f e r e n t :  like in
the AI p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m ,  P a r e t o  o p t i m a l i t y  is in te rm s of 
e x p e c t e d  util it y, and is t h e r e f o r e  to be me a n t  as an e x - a n t e  
c o n c e p t .
It is s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  to c h e c k  that the pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m  
c o n d i t i o n  at w h i c h  p o s i t i v e  share t r a d e s  must take pl a c e  is:
* y# — y-it- —
P u = « 1  ■ n i g gg( x u ) +( 1-a*) . n i b S b ( x u ) ( 32a)
■H- y -W- — y -8- —
Po= Oii .nl £ R x 0 + ( 1-Oi) .ni b r x Q C 32b)
for all iEN. E q u a t i o n  (32) is the s t a n d a r d  p r i c e - m a r g i n a l
21 -  
u t i l i t y  o p t i m a l i t y  r u le . Si n c e  $ h ( 0 ) “ 0, all heT, *^=0
m e a n s  that 0 ^  a p p e a r s  in no u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s :  Xft = 0 i m p l i e s
0 ih =O, all iEN.
4.3. Asymmetric information equilibrium
At this point, we ca n put t o g e t h e r  the p r e v i o u s  noti on s, 
d e f i n e  an a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  ( s t o c k h o l d e r s ' )
e q u i l i b r i u m ,  and e s t a b l i s h  its e x i s t e n c e .
An ( a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n )  stockholders'
equi librium is a point z E Z , which is both a pseudo-
and a price e q u i 1ibri urn, i . e . such that:
C a) for any firm u E M , there exists a set of
we igh t s u*M such that ( z*,nu*) is a
pseudoequilibrium for u ;
( b) there exists a price system p% R+r 2 such that
*
(z ,p ) is a pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m .
We now e s t a b l i s h  the e x i s t e n c e  of an AIE, and then 




























































































m a i n  line of a r g u m e n t .  C o n s i d e r  a po in t zEZ such that
Ei£Ncii>0. By p r o p o s i t i o n  5, one can a s s o c i a t e  to z a
set of w e i g h t s  n U such that ( z , n U ), z E F u (z), is a
p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  u. Si n c e  no t e c h n o l o g y  ca n be
r e c o g n i z e d  ex - a n t e ,  the p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  a m o u n t  of c a p i t a l
can d i f f e r  a c r o s s  f i r m s  o n l y  b e c a u s e  of the (given) share
a l l o c a t i o n .  On the o t h e r  hand, by p r o p o s i t i o n  6, to z th er e
* -
c o r r e s p o n d s  a l s o  a poin t z £ E ( z ) , an d a pr i c e  v e c t o r  
-a- m + 2  #
p E R ++ , such that (z ,p ) is a pr ic e e q u i l i b r i u m .  At a
«■
p r i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  a c c o r d i n g  to (32), p d e p e n d s  o n ly on the 
g i v e n  c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  x : = C x h^hET- In the full
i n f o r m a t i o n  case, the pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  i d e n t i f i e d  
a set of w e i g h t s  w h o s e  e q u i l i b r i u m  v a lu es w e r e  the same for 
all c o n s u m e r s .  In this AI case, e x p e c t e d  m a r g i n a l  ra t e s  of 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  w i ll c l e a r l y  be c o n s i d e r e d .  We ca n no w 
e s t a b l i s h  the f o l l o w i n g  p r o p o s i t i o n .
Proposition 7. U n d e r  a s s u m p t i o n s  A.1 to A . 5 there 
e x i s t s  an a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  ( s t o c k h o l d e r s ' )  
e q u i 1 i b r i u m .
The pr o o f  is g i v e n  in A p p e n d i x  C.
-a-
C o n s i d e r  n o w  an AIE, z EZ: be i n g  b o th a p s e u d o -  and a 
pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  it m u st s a t i s f y  the f o l l o w i n g .
(a) I i £ N $ { ( x u) 0 i u  = 1, as a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n ,
-a-
h o l d i n g  for any uE M such that 0 i u >O f o r  some i£N;
( b) r £ i e N n io 0 io = 1 » as a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  for
«■
the CR S t e c h n o l o g y ,  w h i c h  a p p l i e s  w h en B i o >0 fo r some iEN;
•a- (j -a ■# y-a- %
( c) p u = a i •n i g £ g ( * u ) + ( 1 - a ^ ) .n i b £ b ( X u ) , as a pr i c e
e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n ,  h o l d i n g  fo r all iEN and any uEM such
-a-
that x u >0 and 0 ^ u f o r  some iEN;
( d)
*
































































































( e) ^ i E N s i h = 1 , as a p r i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n ,  h o l d i n g
b
fo r all h£T such that x^>0.
We c o m b i n e  thes e f e a t u r e s  to o b t a i n  the f o l l o w i n g  resu lt s, 
w h i c h  c h a r a c t e r i z e  an e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h  a s y m m e t r i c  
i n f o r m a t i o n  on t e c h n o l o g i c a l  q u al it y.
Proposition 8. An ( a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n )
b
s t o c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i l i b r i u m  z 6Z has the f o l l o w i n g
p r o p e r t i e s  :
( i) a in i g + ( 1_ a i ) n ÿ b* 1/r, all i E N , for xo >0; fo r
b  u b  u b
xo -0, ° C i n ü  + ( 1-ai) n i b < 1/r;
■B- B  B  B
( ii) If z is such that x o >0, t h en x u = x >□, all 
uEM, i.e. L(z ) = M ;
B- B
( iii) In the c a se sub ( i i ) , p u = p , all uEM.
The p r o o f  is g i v e n  in A p p e n d i x  D.
We b r i e f l y  c o m m e n t  on e a ch po in t s e p a r a t e l y ,  and d e v o t e  
the next s u b s e c t i o n  to the e f f i c i e n c y  a s pe ct s. Poin t ( i) is 
s i m p l y  the e x t e n s i o n  of ( i) of p r o p o s i t i o n  4 to the c a se of 
q u a l i t y  u n c e r t a i n t y :  the m a r g i n a l  r a te of s u b s t i t u t i o n  o v e r
time is r e p l a c e d  here by the e x p e c t e d  m a r g i n a l  rate.
P o i n t  ( ii) d e s e r v e s  a so m e w h a t  d e t a i l e d  c o mm en t. First,
B- B-
x u =x is a n a t u r a l  i m p l i c a t i o n  of t e c h n o l o g i e s  be i n g  
u n r e c o g n i z a b l e  a prio ri : it is not s u r p r i s i n g  that a q u a l i t y
i n d e p e n d e n t ,  a m o u n t  of c a p i t a l  be a l l o c a t e d  to all fi r m s
B-
al ike. H o we ve r, and m o r e  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  x >0 always, i.e. 
w h a t e v e r  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of . In o t h e r  words, in spite of 
the s i mp le b i n o m i a l  q u a l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  th e r e  is no zero 
tr a d e  r e su lt of the kind d i s c u s s e d  by A k e r l o f  (1 97 0) . This 
is due to the m o d e l ' s  i n t e r t e m p o r a l  s e tt in g. P r o v i d e d  the 
m a r g i n a l  rate of s u b s t i t u t i o n  o v er time g o es to i n f i n i t y  as 




























































































" i m p a t i e n c e "  can a l w a y s  c o u n t e r b a l a n c e  w h a t e v e r  p e s s i m i s t i c
o p i n i o n  abou t q u a l i t y  they m a y  have. This ho l d s  fo r any AIE
■a-
such that x o >0. T h is is a c t u a l l y  the r e a l l y  i n t e r e s t i n g
case: gi v e n  A . 2, a g e n t s  a 1w a ys w i sh to c o n s u m e  in the se co nd
■»
p e r i o d  so that, if L(z ) was em pt y, xQ w o u l d  n e c e s s a r i l y  be 
p o s i t i v e .  Ho w e v e r ,  x o >0 is a s s o c i a t e d  w i th L( z ) = M . The 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  i n t e r t e m p o r a l  a l l o c a t i o n  p a t t e r n s  and 
a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  has some n a t u r a l  e f f i c i e n c y  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  that w i ll be ta ke n up in the next su bs e c t i o n .  
Po i n t  (iii) is a c o n s e q u e n c e  of point ( ii) , in the sense
# -M-
that P U = P U ( x u) . A c t u a l l y ,  the e q u i l i b r i u m  share pr i c e  does 
not d e p e n d  d i r e c t l y  on the a g e n t s '  q u a l i t y  e v a l u a t i o n s ,  but 
o n l y  on the e q u i l i b r i u m  c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  (w hi ch , of 
course, does d e p e n d  on a ) . Hence, the shar e m a r k e t  in this 
mo d e l  w o r k s  e x a c t l y  as in the full i n f o r m a t i o n  case, w i t h  no 
d i r e c t  i n f l u e n c e  of the ag en t s '  s u b j e c t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n s  on 
share t r a d i n g  as such.
4.4. Efficiency aspects and subjective evaluations
«•
We c o n c e n t r a t e  here on the c a se w h e r e  xo >0 at an AIE, in 
f a ct the most r e l e v a n t  case. We r e f e r  to A p p e n d i x  D for a 
p r o o f  that the f o l l o w i n g  e q u a t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  an A I E  in 
such a c a s e :
S( ci , x ) = p( x ) /r ( 33)
w h e r e  we use the v e c t o r  n o t a t i o n  c : = [ c ̂  ^ e ̂  . The f o l l o w i n g
d e f i n i t i o n  holds:
S(c<i, x) : = Ei£Nainig®iu
F o r  e a ch i£N and uEM, is the s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  that
u be "good", w h i l e  n±g is the e x p e c t e d  m a r g i n a l  r a te of 




























































































e v a l u a t e d  w h en the l a t t e r  is f i n a n c e d  by i n v e s t m e n t  in a 
"g oo d" firm. Thus, SCc-j, x) is the w e i g h t e d  sum of e x p e c t e d  
m a r g i n a l  ra te s of s u b s t i t u t i o n  o v e r  time r e l a t i v e  to the
s h a r e h o l d e r s  of f i r m  u, u n d e r  the a s s u m p t i o n  that the la tt er
22
is us i n g  a g o od t e c h n o l o g y
On the ot h e r  hand, the ra t i o  p( x ) /r is the m a r g i n a l  rate 
of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  b e t w e e n  fi r s t  and s e co nd p e ri od 
c o n s u m p t i o n .  Th e l a t t e r  is g e n e r a t e d  by t r a d i n g  off 
i n v e s t m e n t  in the CRS t e c h n o l o g y  and an e x - a n t e  u n c e r t a i n  
t e c h n o l o g y  ( y i e l d i n g  £ g ( -) and $(->( ■) w i t h  d i f f e r e n t
p r o b a b i l i t i e s )  un d e r  the c o n s t r a i n t  that the e x - p o s t  o u t c o m e
„ ,,,23is good
E q u a t i o n  (33) ca n be r e ad as an e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n .  On 
the left hand side we have a w e i g h t e d  sum of the m a r g i n a l  
ra t e s  at w h i c h  c o n s u m e r s  e x c h a n g e  c u r r e n t  a g a i n s t  f u t u r e  
c o n s u m p t i o n ;  on the ri gh t hand side we have the m a r g i n a l  




























































































and f u t u r e  p r o d u c t i o n .  Both ra t e s  are e v a l u a t e d  un d e r  the 
c o n s t r a i n t  that the e x - a n t e  u n c e r t a i n  t e c h n o l o g y  ta k e s  an 
e x - p o s t  value "good". F i g u r e  2 d e s c r i b e s  the e q u i l i b r i u m  
c o n d i t i o n  i d e n t i f i e d  by e q u a t i o n  (33) . The f u n c t i o n  p( x) is
i n c r e a s i n g  in x and such that p(0)>0, w h i l e  S(c<j,x) is
24
s m o o t h l y  d e c r e a s i n g  in x, n e v e r  r e a c h i n g  the a x is We
r e f e r  to a p p e n d i x  D f o r  details.
In the r e m a i n i n g  part of this s e c t i o n  we shall c o m m e n t  on 
the f o l l o w i n g  po in t s :  ( i) the r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  P a r e t o
o p t i m a l i t y  and the a g e n t s '  s u b j e c t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n s ;  (ii) the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  the ag en ts ' r i sk a t t i t u d e s ,  their 
s u b j e c t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n s  and the AIE i n t e r t e m p o r a l  a l l o c a t i o n ;  
( iii) the role p l a y e d  by the a s s u m p t i o n  that a g e n t s  d i f f e r  
in th e i r  p r e f e r e n c e s .
C i3 In p r i n c i p l e ,  gi v e n  the agents' q u a l i t y  e v a l u a t i o n s ,  
an A I E  has - in ex a n te terms, i.e. w i t h  r e s p e c t  to those 
e v a l u a t i o n s  - the same e f f i c i e n c y  p r o p e r t i e s  as the FIE: it
is c o n s t r a i n e d  P a r e t o  e f f i c i e n t ,  gi ve n the n o n c o n v e x i t y  of 
the ( s t o c k o w n e r s h i p )  f e a s i b l e  set Z.
Now, c o n s i d e r  an y agen t i's first p e r i o d  c o n s u m p t i o n  at 
the A I E  z :
■K- -K- -><• ->$.
° i 1 = W i " t P  t u E M 8 iu + P o a io3 C34J
wh e r e  w ^ >0 is his fi r s t  p e r i o d  c o m m o d i t y  e n d o w m e n t .  Gi v e n  
the AI E c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  x , the m a x i m u m  f e a s i b l e  ( e x - a n t e  
P a r e t o  optimal) f i r s t  p e r i o d  c o n s u m p t i o n  f o r  i is c l e a r l y
c i 1= w i"tx E u e M 0 1 u + xo 0 io ] .
In the case of a FI E (z, s a y ) , the c o n s u m p t i o n  i n e f f i c i e n c y
a r o s e  b e c a u s e  a g e n t s  p l a c e d  an e v a l u a t i o n  P j = £• j( * j)/r>x-j on
*
each f i r m  j e L ( z ) . At an AIE, however, p is g i v e n  by (see 




























































































p (X ) - -Cp C x ) . C 5 e (x ) - 3 b (x ) ] + 5 b C* ) }/r (35)
w h i c h i s not n e c e s s a r i l y  g r e a t e r
■if
than x . The
C u n r e c o g n i z a b l e ) f i r m ' s  e q u i l i b r i u m  value m i g h t  i n d e e d  be
-R- -W
p = X . This is so w h e n e v e r  a  is such that e q u a t i o n ( 33) ,
(34) and (35) are m u t u a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  at a
•if
va lu e p ■
■if
x . In
such a case , the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of the ag en t s ' q u a l i t y
e v a l u a t i o n s  leads e a c h  c o n s u m e r  to c h o o s e  the e x - a n t e  P a r e t o  
o p t i m a l  c o n s u m p t i o n .  T h is h a p p e n s  o n l y  w h en a  is d i f f e r e n t  
f r o m  a. The a g e n t s '  w r o n g  e v a l u a t i o n s ,  b e c a u s e  of their
b e i n g  w r o n g , ma y lead t h em to pick up the fi r s t  p e r i o d
25
c o n s u m p t i o n  a l l o c a t i o n  that a p l a n n e r  w o u l d  c h o o s e  e x - a n t e
( ii) As a l r e a d y  no t i c e d ,  th er e is an i n t e r r e l a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  the a d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n  p r o b l e m  and the i n t e r t e m p o r a l  
a l l o c a t i o n  m e c h a n i s m .  U s i n g  the p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  n o t i o n  
b r i n g s  the ag en t s '  a t t i t u d e s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to time and risk 
in the f i r m  o p t i m i z a t i o n ,  so that a link is e s t a b l i s h e d  
b e t w e e n  the a g e n t s '  risk a v e r s i o n  and the role p l a y e d  by 
th ei r q u a l i t y  e v a l u a t i o n s .
A s t a r t i n g  poin t for d i s c u s s i o n  can be p r o v i d e d  by the 
well kn o w n  n o - t r a d e  A k e r l o f  r e s u l t  and its r e l e v a n c e  in this 
model. A s s u m p t i o n  A . 2 on u t i l i t y  m a k e s  the ag en t s '  
i n t e r t e m p o r a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n  ra t e s  d e p e n d  s m o o t h l y  on x, and 
a l l o w s  t h e r e f o r e  to f i n d  a l w a y s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h  p o s i t i v e  
trades. A s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  le ad s to " w r o n g "  c a p i t a l  
a l l o c a t i o n s ,  but d o es not driv e g o od q u a l i t y  out of the 
m a r k e t  .
A c t u a l l y ,  the z e ro trade r e su lt r e q u i r e s  as a n e c e s s a r y  
(but not s u f f ic ie nt ) c o n d i t i o n  that the f u n c t i o n  S ( .,x) 
take s a f i n i t e  value, S say, w h e n  x goes to zero. That is, 
the s m o o t h n e s s  a s s u m p t i o n  is vi o l a t e d :  th er e m u st be a 
f i n i t e  value n^g such that n ^ g= n ^ g ^ O  fo r c-L2=0, all ieN. 
T h is no tr ad e e q u i l i b r i u m  a l so r e q u i r e s  that p ( 0 ) / r >  S 
( f i g u r e  3).




























































































a l w a y s  exists. T h is as s u m p t i o n ,  h o we ve r, i m p l i e s  risk 
a v e r s i o n  w h i c h  - not s u r p r i s i n g l y  - d o es a f f e c t  the p a t t e r n  
of i n t e r t e m p o r a l  a l l o c a t i o n .  At a FIE, we had the o b v i o u s  
f e a t u r e  that
* *
c i 1 +( cj^/r) = Wi
f o r  all iGN. At an AIE w i th risk a v e r s e  trad er s, this 
i n t e r t e m p o r a l  c o n s u m p t i o n  p a t t e r n  c a n n o t  be a c h i e v e d  by 
a g e n t s  c o r r e c t l y  p e r c e i v i n g  the a v e r a g e  q u al it y, i.e. when 
a ^ =  a, all i£N. One can show that this p a t t e r n  can i n d e e d  be 
a c h i e v e d  if a is such that the e q u a t i o n s
# - 
rS( c 1 , x) =* a
p( x) = a
are c o n s i s t e n t  f o r  a p o s i t i v e  value of x. A v e c t o r  a h a  may 




























































































c o n s u m p t i o n  p a t t e r n  as the FIE: some i n c o r r e c t  s u b j e c t i v e
e v a l u a t i o n  v e c t o r  mi g h t  c o u n t e r b a l a n c e  the d i s t o r t i o n
i n d u c e d  by risk a v e r s i o n .  We no w want to r u le out such 
d i s t o r t i o n ,  and c o n s i d e r  the risk n e u t r a l i t y  case.
If all ieN are r i sk neut ra l, is i n d e p e n d e n t  of the
q u a n t i t y  of c a p i t a l  x for all i: the s m o o t h n e s s  a s s u m p t i o n
CA.2) is v i o l a t e d  i p so f a c t o . In this case, S(c^,x) is a 
c o n s t a n t ,  S say, an d the no tr ad e r e s u l t  f o l l o w s  when
p( 0) /R >S . We ca n f u r t h e r  c h a r a c t e r i z e  this point: risk
n e u t r a l i t y  i m p l i e s  n!jjg = n^j-,= n^, say, so that ( i) of
p r o p o s i t i o n  0 r e d u c e s  to a c o n s t r a i n t  on u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s ,  
n^=1/r. Hence, e x i s t e n c e  of e q u i l i b r i u m  un d e r  risk
n e u t r a l i t y  r e q u i r e s  that all a g e n t s  have the same
i n t e r t e m p o r a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  o b e y i n g  that c o n s t r a i n t ,  a l t h o u g h  
th ei r s u b j e c t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n s  may di ff er . If t h is is i n de ed 
the case, then (33) b e c o m e s
S : “ ( 1 /r) ^ i e N a i0 iu = Ft x) (33')
and e q u i l i b r i u m  (be it p o s i t i v e  or zero trade) d e p e n d s  o n ly 
on the ag en t s '  e v a l u a t i o n s .  A zero tr ad e e q u i l i b r i u m  o c c u r s  
when these ar e s u f f i c i e n t l y  p e s s i m i s t i c ,  since th e i r  
(c on s t a n t )  rate of i n t e r t e m p o r a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n  c a n n o t  ad ju st 
to c o m p e n s a t e  fo r them.
In or d e r  to s e p a r a t e  out the r o le of the a s s u m p t i o n s  on 
risk a t t i t u d e s  on the one hand, and on the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of
on the other, we n o w  c o m p a r e  a r i sk n e u t r a l  AIE w i t h  a
u u
FIE. C o n s i d e r  t h e r e f o r e  an e x i s t i n g  AIE at w h i c h  n i g = n ib 
= 1 / r , all iEN. In ge n e r a l ,  s e co nd p e r i o d  o u t p u t  at an AIE is 
gi v e n  by
^heT^ht x ^ h e M ' f  h( x h) + m -§(* ) + r x o (36)
w h e r e  §( -) = a£jg( •)+ ( 1 ~ a) Sb is the a v e r a g e  d i v i d e n d .  Each 
c o n s u m e r  ieN and e a ch TS jeM will o b t a i n  a s e c o n d  p e r i o d  




























































































# _ # ■>{. # # 
o i 2 = 5C x ) - E U EM0 iu+ 0 ior *o C 3 ? a)
e J2 - fifjC**) C 37b)
*
We a l r e a d y  saw the f u ll i n f o r m a t i o n  result, c^-j +
■it-
( C i 2 / r ^ = w i* In o r d e r  to see w h e t h e r  this ho l d s  at a risk 
n e u t r a l  AIE, we r e c a l l  f r o m  (34) agen t i's fi r s t  p e r i o d  
c o n s u m p t i o n  un d e r  A I :
C i1 = w i “ [p r u £ M a i u + P o 0 ioû
Si n c e  we are a s s u m i n g  = 1/r, by e q u a t i o n  (32b) we 
have p Q = xQ . A f t e r  some m a n i p u l a t i o n s ,  we o b t a i n  the 
f o l l o w i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  h o l d i n g  at an AIE:
c i 1+( c i 2 / r 3 = wi -{p -[ Q( x ) /r] > I U E M 0 iu ( 30)
The e x p r e s s i o n  in c u r l y  b r a c k e t s  is the d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  
the e v a l u a t i o n  p l a c e d  on any u n r e c o g n i z a b l e  f i r m  (p ) and
the pr es en t va l u e  of the a v e r a g e  d i v i d e n d ,  e s t i m a t e d  usin g
-*
the o b j e c t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  [ £j( x )/r] . It is s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  
to c h e c k  that this d i f f e r e n c e  is zero ( in this risk ne ut r a l  
case) when a ̂  = a f o r all ieN, i.e. w h e n  a g e n t s  p e r c e i v e  
c o r r e c t l y  the q u a l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  Risk n e u t r a l i t y  and 
c o r r e c t  p e r c e p t i o n  of the d i s t r i b u t i o n  y i e l d  the same 
i n t e r t e m p o r a l  c o n s u m p t i o n  p a t t e r n  as full i n f o r m a t i o n .
( iii) In ge n e r a l ,  d i f f e r e n t  ag en t s '  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  p l ay 
the role of c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g  each o t h e r  to " a v e r a g e  out" the 
m a r k e t  o u tc om e. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  this is so a l so in the 
p r e s e n t  case. W i t h  i d e n t i c a l  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  e q u i l i b r i u m  
r e q u i r e s  that the a g e n t s '  s u b j e c t i v e  q u a l i t y  e v a l u a t i o n s  be 
c o n s i s t e n t  w i th e a c h  o t h e r  in the se n s e  of be i n g  equal, 
a l t h o u g h  they n e e d  not c o i n c i d e  w i t h  the o b j e c t i v e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n .  T h is can be seen d i r e c t l y  f r o m  ( i) of 




























































































c o n d i t i o n
a i n ig + ( 1- a i ) n i b “ 1/r
s o l v e s  f o r  a u n i q u e  va l u e  of , a say, f o r  all i E N 2 6 . 
Thus, w h en all a g e n t s  have the same p r e f e r e n c e s  the 
e x i s t e n c e  of an A I E  i m p o s e s  a c o n s i s t e n c y  r e q u i r e m e n t  on the 
a g e n t s '  s u b j e c t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n s ,  though, of co ur se , it does 
not i m p o s e  that a = cc. If h o w e v e r  this is i n d e e d  the case 
( a g e n t s  are i d e n t i c a l  and p e r c e i v e  c o r r e c t l y  the o b j e c t i v e  
q u a l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n ) ,  an AIE e x i s t s  o n l y  w h e n  rib= 1/r:
i.e., we are back to the r i sk n e u t r a l  case. Thus, the 
s p r e a d i n g  of a g e n t s '  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  pl a y s  a key role. 
N o n d e g e n e r a t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of a=[ a^] j.EN can s u s t a i n  an AIE 
o n ly b e c a u s e  of the t r a d e r s '  d i f f e r e n c e s .  W h e n e v e r  this is 
not so, for e q u i l i b r i u m  to exis t the d i s t r i b u t i o n  C a i 3 i E N  
m u st be c o l l a p s e d  to a s i ng le value. Thus, it is r e a l l y  the 
a g e n t s '  d i f f e r e n t  u t i l i t i e s  w h i c h  a l l o w  d i f f e r e n t  s u b j e c t i v e  
e v a l u a t i o n s  to be c o n s i s t e n t l y  a v e r a g e d  out at an AIE.
S. Concluding remarks
In this p a p e r  a s t a n d a r d  t w o - q u a l i t y  a s y m m e t r i c  
i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o b l e m  has b e en a n a l y z e d  w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  to a 
c o m p e t i t i v e  c a p i t a l  ma rk e t ,  m o d e l e d  w i t h i n  a s t o c k h o l d e r s '  
e q u i l i b r i u m  f r a m e w o r k .  D r è z e ' s  o r i g i n a l  n o t i o n  a l l o w s  to 
d e t e r m i n e  j o i n t l y  the e q u i l i b r i u m  a l l o c a t i o n s  of 
c o n s u m p t i o n ,  c a p i t a l  an d shares. In this paper, his 
f r a m e w o r k  has b e en m o d i f i e d  to i n c l u d e  a s y m m e t r i c  
i n f o r m a t i o n  on t e c h n o l o g i c a l  q u al it y. The m a i n  r e s u l t s  are 
that i n t e r t e m p o r a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  and a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  
m a y  i n t e r a c t  to y i e l d  p o s i t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  trades, 
i r r e s p e c t i v e  of the a g e n t s '  s u b j e c t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n s .
M o r e o v e r ,  the a g e n t s '  d i f f e r e n t  a t t i t u d e s  t o w a r d  time and 




























































































a l l o c a t i o n s  of c a p i t a l  and shares.
The Key a s s u m p t i o n s  of the pape r are c l e a r l y  the s i mp le
27
b i n o m i a l  q u a l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  , the s u b j e c t i v e  q u a l i t y  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  b e i n g  e x o g e n o u s  and held w i t h  c e r t a i n t y 20 and, 
last but not least, the TS's fee b e i n g  e x o g e n o u s l y  given. As 
a f i r s t  step t o w a r d s  a m o re ge ne ra l model, the q u a l i t y  
e v a l u a t i o n s  s h o u l d  be e n d o g e n i z e d .  This mi g h t  i n v o l v e  m a k i n g  
t h em d e p e n d  on the a c t u a l  q u a l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  so that 
l e a r n i n g  b e h a v i o u r  can be m o d e l e d  and the c o n v e r g e n c e  of the 
s u b j e c t i v e  to the o b j e c t i v e  q u a l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s t ud ie d. A 
c o m p l e t e  a c c o u n t  of a ge ne r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  e c o n o m y  w i th 
q u a l i t y  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  h o we ve r, s h ou ld c e r t a i n l y  i n c l u d e  - as 
a f u r t h e r  step - an e n d o g e n o u s  o b j e c t i v e  q u a l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n .  T h is a r i s e s  f o r m  the i n t e r p l a y  b e t w e e n  the 
b e h a v i o u r  o v er time of the set of e x i s t i n g  fi rm s, the 
a g e n t s '  s u b j e c t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n s  and th e i r  l e a r n i n g  b e h a v i o u r .  
All this c l e a r l y  i n v o l v e s  a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  m o d e l i n g  of 
the q u a l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  p o s s i b l y  w i t h i n  a full f l e d g e d  
t e m p o r a r y  e q u i l i b r i u m  f r a m e w o r k .
As to the TS's fees, these sh ou ld be e n d o g e n i z e d  at the 
p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  level to mo d e l  the " d i v i d e n d  p o l i c y "  of 
the firm. I r r e s p e c t i v e  of a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  it coul d 
be a t e n t a t i v e  s o l u t i o n  to the p r o b l e m  of m o d e l i n g  an 
e x c h a n g e  b e t w e e n  a g e n t s  o w n i n g  a t e c h n o l o g y  an d a g e n t s  who 
are s i m p l y  o u t s i d e  in ve s t o r s .
T h e s e  ( many) p o s s i b l e  a m e n d m e n t s  m i g h t  p e r h a p s  c o n f i r m  
the b a s i c  r e su lt of the paper: in the p r e s e n c e  of a s y m m e t r i c
i n f o r m a t i o n ,  the p r e s e n c e  of m a n y  p r i c e - t a k i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  
a l l o w s  the t r a d e r s '  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r t e m p o r a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  to 
c o m p e n s a t e  fo r thei r d i f f e r e n t  s u b j e c t i v e  q u a l i t y  
e v a l u a t i o n s .  As a c o n s e q u e n c e ,  i n e f f i c i e n t  o u t c o m e s  can be 
s u s t a i n e d ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  of p r e v a i l i n g  p e s s i m i s t i c  o p i n i o n s  





























































































 ̂ A g e n e r a l  s u r v e y  on i n f o r m a t i o n  d e p e n d e n t  m a r k e t  
m e c h a n i s m s  i n v o l v i n g  p r i c e - q u a l i t y  li nk s is p r o v i d e d  by 
S t i g l i t z  (1 98 7) , w i t h  an e x t e n d e d  b i b l i o g r a p h y ;  see also 
L a f f o n t  and M a s k i n  (1 98 2) . Gr e e n  (1985) p r o v i d e s  a r e f e r e n c e  
f r a m e w o r k  fo r a n a l y z i n g  the role of p r i v a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n .
2
The use of t w o - p e r i o d  m o d e l s  for the a n a l y s i s  of 
f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  has a long s t a n d i n g  in the li te ra tu re : 
e . g . , D i a m o n d  (1 96 7) , M o s s i n  (1971), D r e z e  (197 4) . Ou r mo d e l  
d i f f e r s  f r o m  this l i t e r a t u r e  m a i n l y  in its r u l i n g  out 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  u n c e r t a i n t y .
3
Dr ez e p o i n t s  out that st rict qu as i c o n c a v i t y  is r e a l l y  
not n e c e s s a r y ;  it is n e v e r t h e l e s s  a s s u m e d  h e re for the sake 
of s i m p l i c i t y .  It i m p l i e s  " d i m i n i s h i n g  m a r g i n a l  rate of time 
p r e f e r e n c e " :  see D r e z e  (1987, p .265). All q u o t a t i o n s  of
D r e z e ' s  w o rk r e f e r r e d  to as Dr e z e  ( 1987) are f r o m  his 1987 
v e r s i o n  of Dr e z e  (1974).
4
S t r i c t l y  sp ea ki ng , an i n t e r i o r  s o l u t i o n  f o r  iGN is 
g r a n t e d  w h en u^ is s t r o n g l y  q u a s i - c o n c a v e ,  i.e. such that 
its H e s s i a n  m a t r i x  is n e g a t i v e  d e f i n i t e  (e .g., B a r t e n  and 
B o h m , 1982).
^ This a s s u m p t i o n  does not a l t e r  ou r re s u l t s ,  so long as 
each TS is f o r b i d d e n  to in vest in his own t e c h n o l o g y .
6 As will be a r g u e d  in the c o n c l u d i n g  r e m a r k s  ( s e c t i o n  5), 
e n d o g e n i z i n g  this p a r a m e t e r  s h ou ld a l l o w  to m o d e l  e x p l i c i t l y  
a sort of " d i v i d e n d  p o l i c y "  for the firm. T h is d e s e r v e s  
t r e a t m e n t  in its own right, i n d e p e n d e n t l y  of i n f o r m a t i o n a l  
a s y m m e t r i e s .  F u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  on this poin t is be i n g  




























































































In this sense, qjC .) is a c t u a l l y  similar, but not 
i d e n t i c a l ,  to T o b i n ' s  w e ll know n " m a r g i n a l  q": see, e.g.,
Y o s h i k a w a  (1980).
^ We use q .) fo r the sake of g e n e r a l i t y .  Sinc e 6 j= 6 fo r 
all JEM i m p l i e s  Rj= R (a c o n s t a n t ) ,  we m i g h t  as well have 
u s ed fj(.).
g
We a s s u m e  h o ne st b e h a v i o u r :  the fee is paid anyway.
N o t i c e  that c o n s t r a i n t  ( 5e) rules out s h o r t - h o l d i n g s  of 
s e c u r i t i e s .  A l l o w i n g  t h em s h ou ld not a l t e r  our r e su lt s, so 
long t h ey are b o u n d e d  (D rè ze , 1987, p.268, f n . 1 0 ) .
^  This is s i m i l a r  to D r e z e ' s  ac co un t (1 98 7, p p . 26 8- 26 9) .
12 This s h ou ld be c o n t r a s t e d ,  e.g., w i t h  D e b r e u ' s  (1959) 
t r e a t m e n t ,  w h e r e  the sh ar e a l l o c a t i o n  is e x o g e n o u s l y  given: 
c o n v e x i t y  of the p r o d u c t i o n  sets is e n o u g h  to e n s u r e  P a r e t o  
o p t i m a l i t y  of the e q u i l i b r i u m .
13 We r e s e r v e  the w o r d  " f ir m" for a c t i v e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  JEM.
14
N o t i c e  that
FjC z) : = { 2 EZ | E a e A c a1 + Xj < W - H h e T xh , h 1= j ; o i2 < Bi j S j C X j )  + 
E hETSihSh( x hJ > h t°j. a11 i £ N >
w h i c h  is c l e a r l y  c o m p a c t  and convex, [ h£T C h j ) and 0 
b e i n g  g i v e n .
15
This t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  p r e s e r v e s  strict q u a s i - c o n c a v i t y .
Here, like in all s u b s e q u e n t  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  the p r o v i s o  




























































































17 N o t i c e  that
E(z):={zEZ| EaEAce1 5 w_EjETxj; °i2 < EJETS1 jS j( x j) . all 
iEN; J eT}
w h i c h  is c l e a r l y  c o m p a c t  and co nv ex , C x j ] jeT b e i n g given.
10 If p : = [ p j ] j 6 j is the sh ar e pr ic e v e c t o r  f a c e d  by e a ch 
c o n s u m e r  and w ^ > 0  his we al t h ,  i's b u d g e t  c o n s t r a i n t  will 
read p) :-{( c ± <\ , 0*) | c ± ! + E jejP j0 i j 5 w i>- Not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  
Pj will turn out to be the f i r m  j 's value.
19 The c o n s i s t e n c y  b e t w e e n  the f i r m ' s  and its s h a r e h o l d e r s '  
m a x i m u m  p r o b l e m s  ma y be a n a l y z e d  w i t h i n  a s i m p l e  game, as 
shown in A p p e n d i x  A.
20
We re f e r  to Dr e z e  (1 97 2, 1974, 1987) fo r a c o m p l e t e  
a n a l y s i s  of the o p t i m a l i t y  p r o p e r t i e s  of a s t o c k h o l d e r s '  
e q u i 1 i b r i u m .
21
In ot h e r  words, e q u a t i o n s  (32) are s i m p l y  the e x p l i c i t  
f o r m u l a t i o n  of the i m p l i c i t  o p t i m a l i t y  c o n d i t i o n
( 6 W 1 / 6 e t J ) / { 6 W 1 / 6 c î , ) < pj, J- u ,0
h o l d i n g  w i t h  e q u a l i t y  fo r p o s i t i v e  trades.
22
In the f o l l o w i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  we m i g h t  use i n d i f f e r e n t l y  
an e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  d e r i v e d  us in g ’’bad" t e c h n o l o g i e s ,  
of the kind
U -g- i'c i'c
E iENÎ 1 _ a i) n i b e iu ■ «( x )/r
wh e r e  b o th the m a r g i n a l  ra t e s  of s u b s t i t u t i o n  ( n ^ )  and the 
m a r g i n a l  rate of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  ( v ( x ) ) r e f e r  to a bad 




























































































a s u m m a t i o n  o v e r  a g e n t s  b e c a u s e  of the e x t e r n a l i t y  i m p l i e d  
by a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m .
23
p(x) is i n d e p e n d e n t  of any such p r o b a b i l i t y :  see
A p p e n d i x  D .
24  U s i n g  our ex a m p l e ,  f j ( x j ) = a j 1o g ( x j  + 1), j=g,b, p(x) is 
linear, i.e., p( x) = [ R(x + 1)- a ^ ] / ( Og-a^) •
25 C l ea rl y, a c o m p l e t e  a n a l y s i s  of t h is point s h o u l d  
r e q u i r e  m o d e l i n g  an e n d o g e n o u s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of the ag en ts ' 
q u a l i t y  e v a l u a t i o n s .  S o m e  br i e f  r e m a r k s  are o f f e r e d  in 
s e c t i o n  5.
This is so, as long as is s t r i c t l y  less than u n i t y
and Uj[ is ( m o n o t o n i c  and) s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g .
27 Ac t u a l l y ,  this is a r a t h e r  s t a n d a r d  a s s u m p t i o n  in the 
l i t e r a t u r e  (e .g., C a m p b e l l  and Kracaw, 1980), a l t h o u g h  not 
c o m p l e t e l y  in no c u o u s .
2 ^ Th e r e  is a n o t h e r  f e a t u r e  of the m o d e l  w h i c h  may d e s e r v e  
some co m m e n t :  f i r m s  are i m p e r f e c t l y  i n f o r m e d  on the q u a l i t y  
of the t e c h n o l o g i e s  they are using. H o w e v e r ,  it is the 
c o n s u m e r s  who are a c t u a l l y  not in f o r m e d :  they e v a l u a t e
u n k n o w n  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s e s ,  un de r a veil of i g n o r a n c e  
w h i c h  a f f e c t s  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n  to a c c e p t  as o p t i m a l  (o r not) 




























































































APPENDIX A: Optimal Investment with Many Shareholders
In this a p p e n d i x  we c o n s i d e r  the p r o b l e m  of op ti m a l  
i n v e s t m e n t  in a t e c h n o l o g y  w i th s t r i c t l y  d e c r e a s i n g  r e t u r n s  
to sc al e ( DRS) , in the c a se wh e r e  ther e are n "i nv es t o r s " ,  
i n d e x e d  by i E N : = { 1 , . . . , n }. We mode l this p r o b l e m  as a si mp le 
n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  game, as fo l l o w s .  The i n v e s t o r s  are a s s u m e d  
to a l l o c a t e  th e i r  w e a l t h  b e t w e e n  a c o n s t a n t  r e t u r n  to scale 
( CRS) and the DRS t e c h n o l o g y .  For s i m p l i c i t y ' s  sake, we 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  thes e i n v e s t o r s  by th e i r  w e a l t h  (W^, . . . ,W n ) , 
and a s s u m e  that e a ch of t h e m  c h o o s e s  his i n v e s t m e n t  plan so 
as to m a x i m i z e  his o v e r a l l  return. An i n v e s t m e n t  plan for 
i E N is a pair (a^, b ^ ) >0 such that a^+ b^ < W^ : a^ d e n o t e s  
the a m o u n t  i n v e s t e d  in the CRS t e c h n o l o g y ,  y i e l d i n g  Ra^, and 
bi d e n o t e s  the a m ou nt i n v e s t e d  in the D R S  te c h n o l o g y .  We 
d e s c r i b e  the l a t t e r  w i th a s t r i c t l y  c o nc av e, c o n t i n u o u s l y  
d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  f ( .), such that the 
i n v e s t m e n t  b^ y i e l d s  a r e t u r n  ( b-j_/ ̂ k,EN^k^ ^KeN^k^ t° agent
i. This r e t u r n  then d e p e n d s  on the o t h e r  a g e n t s '  i n v e s t m e n t
#■ *
plans. A N a sh e q u i l i b r i u m  is d e f i n e d  by ( Q i > b i)ieN> such 
that
«■ ■*
(a^jb^) m a x i m i z e s  
b i
Ra± + ------------ b i + E kt=ib k)
b i + E kt=ib k
for all ieN. Let us c o n s i d e r  i n v e s t o r  i. D e n o t i n g  by B the 
a m o u n t  i n v e s t e d  by the o t h e r  i n v e s t o r s ,  i's p r o b l e m  is to 



























































































R a ^ + [ b ^ / ( b ^ + B ) ] f C b^ + B), su bj ec t to
( a i ,b i ) >0
ai+ b^< W ±
At an i n t e r i o r  so lu ti on , we have
aj+ bi = W*  ( A . 1)
1 .  bt  bj
— ---- fC t>i+ B) C 1 ----;----) + — ----  f ' C b i +  B) =R C A . 2)
b i + B b i + B b^ + B
E q u a t i o n  ( A . 2) i m p l i e s  that a N a sh e q u i l i b r i u m  is 
n e c e s s a r i l y  s y m m e t r i c a l  in te r m s  of b^, i.e.
b^= b , all ieN,
«■
w h e r e  b s a t i s i f i e s
f(nb*) *
[ 1 -( 1 /n) ] ----- —  + ( 1 / n) f' ( n b  ) -R ( A . 2')
nb
it
i.e., b is such that R e q u a l s  the c o n v e x  c o m b i n a t i o n  of the 
m a r g i n a l  and a v e r a g e  p r o d u c t i v i t i e s .  B e c a u s e  of the DRS 
a s s u m p t i o n  on f ( .), we have
f ' ( n b  )< R < [ f ( nb ) /nb )
it
W h en n=1, f ' (b )=R, w h i c h  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  the P a r e t o
o p t i m a l  ( c o o p e r a t i v e )  s o l u t i o n .  By c o n t r a s t ,  as n g o es to
s-
i n f i n i t y  the a g g r e g a t e  i n v e s t m e n t  B te n d s  to the s o l u t i o n
it it
of f ( B ) /B = R . The l a t t e r  is r e f e r r e d  to as " a r b i t r a g e "  
s o l u t i o n  in the text, and can be seen as the c o m p e t i t i v e  
s o l u t i o n  h o l d i n g  w h en e a c h  i n v e s t o r ' s  i n d i v i d u a l  w e i g h t  is 




























































































APPENDIX B: Proof o-F Proposition 4
We d e r i v e  in d e t a i l  the f o u r  p o i n t s  d i s c u s s e d  in the text. 
The F I E  c o n d i t i o n s  are:
(a) n ^ j = n  , all JET, all i£N;
Cb) Xj) .n ^ i £ N ® i j * 1 » all JET s.t. 9 ^ j > 0  f o r  some iEN;
( c) n 5 j ( x j ) = p j , all JET, s.t. X j >0 and 0 ^ j > O  for some iEN;
(d) t i E N 0 i j=1, all JET s.t. x j >0.
Point C i)
«■ it
By Ca) , n^j = n . Then ( d) b e c o m e s  
5 x j) ■ ̂ i e N 0 !j “ 1/ n
Take j=0: either
it
xo =0, or xo > 0 . If the l a t t e r ,i by ( d)
it
5 o( x q )
■a-
= 1 / n , which imp lies n*=1/r. If , on the other hand ,
it




x j >0 a n d , by ( a) , (b) and Cc) ,
SjtxJ)
it
= 1 /n Suppose now 1/n
it
< r : then 5jCxj)<r and , by C 12) ,
<lj( Xj3 <1, which cannot be a pseudoequilibrium for firm J,
since
Ì it it i
V (cj),xj)<V Ceil,Xj) , qj(Xj)=1 • Xj>Xj, all iEN S.t.
■J. it
0j_j>O. He n c e  1/n >r.
Poin t ( ii)
*
First, c o n s i d e r  n = 1 / r  an d take any JEM s.t.
# it
( d) and ( b) , $j ( x j ) * r ,  i.e. q j ( x j ) “ 1. Gi v e n
since f'j(.)<0 for all n o n n e g a t i v e  ar gu m e n t s :
it
a c o n s e q u e n c e ,  { JEM | xj = 0 } * B .
C o n s i d e r
it
no w n < 1 / r , and take any JEM s.t,
it
x j >0. By ( d) and
(b), fij(
* it
x j ) - 1 /n > r , i . e • M
it
xj)»! ; hence, q j( 0) > 1 and JEG,
a l t h o u g h Xj<Xj. Thus an y a c t i v e f i r m  b e l o n g s  to G. The
c o n v e r s e , h o w e v e r , i s not true : take a f i r m  JEG s.t.
# it
( 1 /n ) > q j ( 0 ) > 1 ;  cl e a r l y ,  X j ^O in this case. D e f i n e  t h e r e f o r e
■K-
X j >0. T h e n , by
*





























































































L( n*) :={ J8GI q j( 0) < 1 / n * }  ; th en M\L( z *) : - { j E MI q A  0) < 1 / n “ } =B + L
it -M-
(n ), so that i n d e e d  L( z ) c G , w i th  stri ct i n c l u s i o n  h o l d i n g
-  it
w h en  L( n ) is n o n e m p t y .
Poi n t ( i i i)
Ta ke any j£ L ( z  ). T h en  b o th  ( c) and ( d) ap ply . If jfcL(z ), 
then 0 i j = O  all iEN by d e f i n i t i o n  and henc e, by the pr i c e
it
e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n ,  Xj=0.
Po in t (iv)
it it it
We ta ke the c a se  n =1/r. T h e n  L( z ) =G an d q j ( x j ) = 1 ,  all
it
jEl_(z ): he n c e  p r o d u c t i o n  is f u l l y  e f f i c i e n t .  H o we ve r,
c o n s i d e r  an y s h a r e h o l d e r  iEN, wh os e f i r s t  p e r i o d  e n d o w m e n t
■K- #
is W£>0, s.t. 0 i j > O  fo r some jEL( z ); his fi r s t  p e r i o d
it it it
c o n s u m p t i o n  at a FIE is Ci<j = w^ - L jg jP j0 i j • B y C c) ,
it it it -  it it
p j = 0 j( x j ) / r , SO that c ^ < C i ^  := w^- £ j £ T x je ij> the P a r e t o
J  J  J  it it it




























































































APPENDIX C: Proofs of Propositions 5, 6 and 7
(A) Proposition S
C o n s i d e r  any po in t z s.t. ^ i e N 0 ! ^ ^ »  anc* take any uEM. Then 
F u( z) , d e f i n e d  in (21), and V 1 ( -j , x u ) , d e f i n e d  in (22), 
d e s c r i b e  the f i c t i t i o u s  p u b l i c  g o o d  e c o n o m y  we are
i n t e r e s t e d  i n .
(a) To e s t a b l i s h  the e x i s t e n c e  of a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m ,  
n o t i c e  that: ( i) F u (z) is co m p a c t ,  ( ii) F u (z) is convex,
( iii) V i(.,.) is a s t r i c i t l y  q u a s i - c o n c a v e ,  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  
i n c r e a s i n g ,  c o n t i n u o u s l y  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  fu nc ti on .
( i) By d e f i n i t i o n ,
F U C z) :={z6Z | E a E A c a 1 + x u 5 w - E h e T * h . h *=u : c i2 5
xu) + ^ h e T ^ i h S h t x h ^ > h ^ u > a11
so that c o m p a c t n e s s  f o l l o w s  f r o m  £ a e A c a1 + x u5 w “ *-hETx h» 
hf=u, f r o m  w h i c h  c^-j and x u are b o u n d e d  above. By the
d e f i n i t i o n  of Z, c ^ > 0  and x u >0 b o u n d  c ^  and x u f r o m
below. All c o n s t r a i n t s  are closed.
( ii) f o l l o w s  i m m e d i a t e l y  by n o t i n g  that the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  
s u r f a c e  d e s c r i b e d  by (23b) is linear.
(iii) f o l l o w s  f r o m  A . 2, since V X(.,.) is a s t r i c t l y
i n c r e a s i n g  and c o n t i n u o u s  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of u^, be i n g
s t r i c t l y  in (0,1).
U n d e r  ( i ) , ( ii) and (iii) there e x i t s  a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m
(see a l so p r o p o s i t i o n  1), z E F u (z), at w h i c h  the f o l l o w i n g  
mu s t hold:




























































































( b) To e s t a b l i s h  (ex ante) P a r e t o  o p t i m a l i t y ,  n o t i c e  s i m p l y  
that (C.1) is a n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  fo r 
P a r e t o  o p t i m a l i t y  in a c o n v e x  p u b l i c  g o od e c o n o m y  (e.g., 
M a l i n v a u d ,  1972, p. 212).
( c) To e s t a b l i s h  the e x i s t e n c e  of n U , n o te that at a 
p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m ,  (C.1) m u st hold. For any iEN, we have
[ 6 V i/ 6 x u ] / [ 6 V 1 / c i 1 ]=
" a i •n i g ® i u $ g + ( 1 - Q i ) •n i b e i u 3b (C.2)
w h i c h  ta k e s  f i n i t e  v a l u e s  at z for all iEN such that c ^ > 0 .  
On e r e q u i r e s  that th e r e  is some x u = x u >0 such that 
n i j : = n i C C i 1 f $ j ( X u ) } > J-g,b, s a t i s f i e s  (C .1 ). F o l l o w i n g  
d e f i n i t i o n  (25) j is, by A . 2, a c o n t i n u o u s l y  
d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  f u n c t i o n  of c^ 2 and he nc e of x u , d e f i n e d  o v e r  
all x u . Hence, at p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  w h e r e  (C.1) holds, the 
p a i r  (n^g, n ^ )  ex is ts .
(B) Proposition 6
T a ke any zEZ such that J-ieNc i1>0. Then E( z) , d e f i n e d  in 
(29), and W 1 ( c ^ , 0 i )  , d e f i n e d  in (30), d e s c r i b e  the 
f i c t i t i o u s  ec o n o m y ,  a c o m p e t i t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  of w h i c h  is a 
p r i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m  for o u r  ec o n o m y .  E(z) is the f e a s i b l e  set, 
wh i l e  W 1( .,.) r e p r e s e n t s  c o n s u m e r  i's p r e f e r e n c e s  over 
shares, 0-̂  ' = [ Q i u ] u EM > and f i r s t  p e ri od c o n s u m p t i o n ,  c^-] . All 
th re e points, ( a ) , ( b) and ( c) of p r o p o s i t i o n  P.6 f o l l o w
f r o m  the fact that:
( i) E(z) is c o mp ac t;
( ii) E(z) is convex;




























































































( i) By d e f i n i t i o n ,
E ( z ) : - { z E Z |  E a £ A ° a l 5  w_I:h £ T x h; 0 i 2 ~ r h £ T e i h 3 h ( x h) i °> 
all i£N; t i E N S l h  5 1 > a11 h e T >
so that and 8^ are b o th b o u n d e d  f r o m  ab o v e  and below,
all such b o u n d s  b e i n g  cl os ed ;
( ii) fo l l o w s ,  since all c o n s t r a i n t s  are linear;
( iii) f o l l o w s  f r o m  W* (. ,. ) b e i n g  s t r i c t l y  q u a s i - c o n c a v e ,  as 
a s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  and c o n t i n u o u s  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of u^,
b e i n g  s t r i c t l y  in (0,1).
(C) Proposition 7
C o n s i d e r  a poin t zEZ, such that ^ i e N C ^ ^ >0. By c o n s t r u c t i o n ,
z £ F u(z) (all uET) and z E E ( z ) . U n d e r  ou r a s s u m p t i o n s  on
p r e f e r e n c e s  and t e c h n o l o g i e s ,  there is a point
z U := g u( z ) E F U(z) w h i c h  is a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  u at z.
Also, there is a po in t z :=h (z ) E E ( z )  w h i c h  is a
p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  fo r the e c o n o m y  at z. Th e s e  r e s u l t s
f o l l o w  f r o m  p r o p o s i t i o n s  5 and 6. To pr o v e  e x i s t e n c e  of an
*
AIE, one has to p r o v e  that th er e is a po in t z such that
& -M- #
g u( z )■ z for all u ET, and h( z ) = z .
We fi r s t  c o n s i d e r  p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i a  and p r o v e  that, if z 
is a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  u, then g u ( z ) : = z U = z. C o n s i d e r  a 
point zEZ and the r e l a t e d  p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  fo r u, 
z : - ( [ C g ] a e A ,xU ,0 U ) - g ( z ) , w h e r e  c a :" ( c a 1,c a2^ and
x : = [ x h^ h£T- By d e f i n i t i o n  of a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m ,  gi v e n  any 
iEN, V^( c i 1 , xU) >V^( c^ -j , x) . Then, e i t h e r  z U = z, or the 
i n e q u a l i t y  ho ld s st ri ct ly . If the latter, F u (z) - a c o n v e x  
and c o m p a c t  set c o n t a i n i n g  both z U and z - c o n t a i n s  
( z U + z)/2 := z, say, w h i c h  is such that V i (c i^ , x ) > V ^ ( c i ' j , x U );
this c o n t r a d i c t s  the P a r e t o  o p t i m a l i t y  of z U . Hence, i n de ed
u ~ u
z = z . Now, by p r o p o s i t i o n  5 there exis t w e i g h t s  n such that




























































































z U =z for all uET.
We now t a ke up pr i c e  e q u i l i b r i a .  C o n s i d e r  the 
p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  zEZ. A s s o c i a t e d  to z th e r e  is a price 
e q u i l i b r i u m  z : = h ( z ) E  E ( z ) . Si n c e  z is P a r e t o  o p t i m a l  w i t h i n  
E( z) , it is such that W 1( c^ , 0^) > W 1( c ̂  ̂ , 8-^) , for all iEN. 
Again, e i t h e r  z=z or the st ri ct i n e q u a l i t y  ho lds. If the
_ - o
latter, any c o n v e x  c o m b i n a t i o n  of z and z, z say, is
c o n t a i n e d  in E ( z ) , a c o n v e x  set c o n t a i n i n g  b o t h  z and z. 
Then, f o r  all iEN it must be that W^C c^ ■) , 0^) > W i ( c^ -j , 0^) ,
c o n t r a d i c t i n g  the P a r e t o  o p t i m a l i t y  of z. He nc e, th er e is a
a ~ -
poin t z =z=z that is b o th a p r i c e  and a p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m :  
it is an A I E .
APPENDIX D: Proof of Proposition 8
We d e r i v e  in d e t a i l  the thre e p o i n t s  d i s c u s s e d  in the text.
The A I E  c o n d i t i o n s  are:
■î- a a
(a) ^ i l( x u ) 0 iu = s.t. 0 i u > O fo r some iEN,
a a a
( b) r i-i0N n io ® i o  = 1» w h en 0 i o >O for some iEN;
a u -x- * y a a
( c) p u = oti . n i g 3£ ( xu ) +( 1-Oi) • n i b 5b( » a11 iEN, all u E M s.t.
a
6 i u >0 f o r  some iEN;
* ua u -a- x- a
( d) p 0 = [ a * .n ig + ( 1- a * ) .n i b ] r x Q , for xo >0, all iEN,
■a- a
( e) ^ i e N ® i h = all heT s.t. x ̂  > G .
Po i n t ( i)
a- u * u *
T a ke the case xo >0. Then, by C d) , Qin-ja+C l - a ^ n ^ h  is equal
a
a c r o s s  i in e q u i l i b r i u m .  By ( e ) , 0 -lo >O fo r some iEN: he nc e
( b) ap p l i e s .  The CRS t e c h n o l o g y  be i n g  kn o w n  w i t h  c e r t a i n t y ,
■a u a u a



























































































Take no w the case x o =0. Take any uE L ( z  ), and c o n s i d e r
(j-tt- li# #
a i n i£ + ( 1~a i) n i b = n i> say; by (27), (a) can be w r i t t e n  as
x u ) 0 i u = 1/ r - S u p p o s e  n i >1/r; then t l E N q i ( x u ) B i u > 1/ r . 
But this c a n n o t  be an e q u i l i b r i u m ,  since it v i o l a t e s  the
p s e u d o e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  (27) : ac tu al ly , d e f i n e  x u by
— # — # “ i # —
x u ^ 0 iu “ 1/r; then x u < x u , and t h e r e f o r e  V ( c ^ i , x u ) >
v ^ ( c i 1 , x u ) , all iEN. He n c e  n^fl/r.
P o i n t  ( i i)
#
We c o n c e n t r a t e  on the c a se x o >0. By ( i) of p r o p o s i t i o n  8,
u # u # #
( 1 - a ^ ) n i ^ = ( 1/ r ) . A s s u m e  0 i u >O fo r some iEN. Then (a) 
can be w r i t t e n  as
u # # # # #
r i E N a in i £ e i u = ( 1 / r ) { p C X u ) + q b ( xu ) [ q ^ C x u ) +
- q bC x*)]_1 ( 1-tiENB lu) } CD.1)
w h e r e  p( x) : =[ 1- q b ( x) ] /[ qg( x ) - q b ( x) ] is a c o n t i n u o u s  f u n c t i o n  
f r o m  R + i n to itself, such that:
p( 0)>0;
p ' ( x ) = [ q £- q b ] 2 - [ q g ( q b “ 1) + q b ^ 1_c? £ ^ > 0  all x>0;
Indeed, p(x) is the m a r g i n a l  rate of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
fi r s t  an d s e c o n d  p e r i o d  c o n s u m p t i o n ,  the l a t t e r  be i n g  
f i n a n c e d  by a t e c h n o l o g y  f g( x ) . D e f i n e
C 2 == a ic 2 g + ( 1_ a i ) c 2 b » any iEN 
3 ( x ) : =  a i 5 g (x) + ( 1 - a i ) Q b (x)
such that the f o l l o w i n g  c o n s t r a i n t s  hold:
c^< W - x - x Q 
C 2 < 3( x) + r x Q 
c2 j- 5 j( x) + rx o> J'g, b




























































































d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,
rdc^ + d e g  = [ $ ' ( x ) - r ] d x  
r d c 1+ d c 2 2 * C 5 g ( x ) - r ] d x
This s o l v e s  for (dc-j/dc2 g ) |c2b = 0 to S et (dc-|/dc2 g) =
( 1 /r) p( x) , w h i c h  is i n d e p e n d e n t  of a-^.
* . u
We n o w  pr o v e  that x u >0, all u£M. C o n s i d e r  n i g =
nitcii ,Sg C x u )] . By a s s u m p t i o n  A . 2, n ^ X D ,  6 n i £ / 6 x u <0 f o r  all
x u >0 and, for at least one i£N, l i m x _ > 0 nig = °°. S i n c e  a ^ > 0  all
*■
iEN and 8 i u >0 f o r  some iEN, this is so a l s o  for the
c o n t i n u o u s  f u n c t i o n  S( c-j , x u ) : = E i e N a i n i g 0 iu » wh e r e




We n o w  p r o v e  that x u = x , all u£M. F r om A I E  c o n d i t i o n  ( c) and 
( i) of p r o p o s i t i o n  8, we can wr i t e
a in ig = {C RP u ” St)( x u) 3 /[ 5e c x j - 5 bc x *)] }1/r CD. 2)
U ̂such that i s eq ua l for all i_ in_ equi l i b r i u m . By ( D . 1 ) ,
Vr * #
this i m p l i e s  that x u = x all uEM, p r o v i d e d  that ^ l £ N ® i u = ^» 
i.e., by ( e ] , p r o v i d e d  x u >0, as is i n d e e d  the case. At an 
A I E  ( D . 1) b e c o m e s
S( c 1 , x ) = p( x ) / r ( D . 1 ' )
Po i n t  ( iii]
We c o n c e n t r a t e  on the case wh e r e  xo >0. By Cii) of
p r o p o s i t i o n  8, (D.1) s o l v e s  for x "> 0. Also, ( D .2) hold s for
x >0 and £ i e N 0 iu =,|> all u E M . By s u b s t i t u t i n g  for
U*
a i n ig we
o b t a i n





























































































so that p u d o e s  not d e p e n d  d i r e c t l y  on a  or 8. Hence,■g. •{.
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